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Global Reach, Local Grasp: Constructing Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction in the Age of Globalization
By Stephen Coughlan, Robert Currie, Hugh Kindred and Teresa Scassa†

Abstract

torial assertion of Canadian legal authority may well run
into strong opposition from other countries, who might
view Canada as attempting to intervene in their own
national territories and domestic affairs. Likewise, other
states, under the same pressures of globalization as
Canada, may try to exercise their legislative powers, government decrees, and court orders in the territory of
Canada, where they are likely to be rebuffed with equal
indignation. Yet the rapidly growing volume and variety
of transnational interactions between people, activities,
and events, which constitute the engine of globalization,
ensure that the extraterritorial application of national
legal powers cannot be avoided. Consequently the scope,
means and effectiveness of extraterritorial action must be
examined and evaluated.

T

he reach of national law is often greater than its
grasp. Although Canada has effective legal power
over its territory and all within it, Canadian interests are
no longer confined exclusively within Canadian borders.
Canada thus finds it increasingly necessary to consider
asserting its legal jurisdiction beyond its frontiers. Such
extraterritorial assertion of Canadian legal authority may
run into strong opposition from other countries, who
might view Canada as attempting to intervene in their
own national territories and domestic affairs. Likewise,
other states, under the same pressures of globalization,
may try to extend their legal reach into Canadian territory, where they are likely to be rebuffed with equal
indignation. Yet the rapidly growing volume and variety
of transnational interactions between people, activities,
and events, which constitute the engine of globalization,
ensure that the extraterritorial application of national
legal powers cannot be avoided. This paper sets out an
analytical framework to be applied in answering the set
of complex and interlinked questions that arise when
Canada is faced with the issue of whether to act extraterritorially. It does so taking into account the many different factual contexts in which issues of extraterritoriality arise.

The issue of Canada acting extraterritorially is complex, and is not reducible to a single question. Rather, it
involves a set of interlinked questions, each of which in
turn raises several issues. Thus, this paper will not
attempt to provide an answer to a single question; rather,
it will set out an analytical framework to be applied in
answering the ‘‘extraterritoriality question’’ in the many
different factual contexts in which it arises.
To start, it is worth distinguishing between the
questions of when Canada can act extraterritorially, and
when it should act extraterritorially. These questions
themselves each need to be broken down further. To ask
whether Canada ‘‘can’’ act extraterritorially raises at least
the following issues: (i) the domestic legal question of
when Canadian courts (or administrative bodies) will
recognize and implement extraterritorial claims by Parliament or the legislatures; (ii) the international law issue
of when other states will recognize and support Canada’s
claims to act extraterritorially; and (iii) the purely practical consideration of whether any claim Canada might
make to act extraterritorially will be enforceable. Equally,
the question of whether Canada ‘‘should’’ act extraterri-

I. Introduction

T

he reach of national law is often greater than its
grasp. Canada, like other countries, has effective
legal power over its territory and all within it. However,
one consequence of the current process of globalization,
for good or ill, is that Canadian interests are no longer
contained exclusively within Canadian borders. Canada
thus finds it increasingly necessary to consider asserting
its legal jurisdiction beyond its frontiers. Such extraterri-
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torially raises various considerations, including, as follows: (i) what domestic considerations will tempt
Canada to legislate with extraterritorial effect; (ii) what
considerations regarding international relations should
militate both for and against Canada acting extraterritorially; and (iii) related to (ii), what attitude Canada
should adopt towards other states acting extraterritorially
in Canada’s jurisdiction. In this paper, we will not
approach the question of ‘‘should’’ in the sense of considering the desired policy outcomes that might motivate
extraterritorial action — that is a question for domestic
policy-makers. Rather, we will consider how to determine whether extraterritorial action ‘‘should’’ be used as
a means of implementing policy choices, whatever they
may be.
The questions above hinge on having a relatively
clear understanding of what it means to ‘‘act extraterritorially’’, but that phrase itself is not free from ambiguity.
Some legislative or judicial action has an impact or influence outside Canada’s geographical borders but nonetheless ought not to be considered truly ‘‘extraterritorial’’
because the impact is coincidental. Further, in this context even the word ‘‘act’’ requires clarification. Most obviously a government ‘‘acts’’ when it passes prohibitory
legislation. However, many other alternatives are also
open to governments when they attempt to affect the
behaviour of actors domestically or abroad, and so the
methods by which Canada might act extraterritorially
also need to be discussed.
Broadly speaking, this paper will proceed in two
stages. In the first stage (Parts II and III), we will set out a
series of distinctions, aimed at clarifying the analytical
tools necessary to understand the various inter-related
extraterritoriality questions noted above. We will consider issues of jurisdiction, distinguishing between territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction, and defining and
discussing legislative/prescriptive jurisdiction, executive/enforcement jurisdiction, investigative jurisdiction,
and judicial/adjudicative jurisdiction. We will then discuss the mechanics of extraterritorial action, including
the ability to affect the behaviour of individuals, corporations and other states, and the different abilities of the
federal and provincial/territorial governments in this
regard. We will then discuss the means by which extraterritorial action is taken, where we will draw the distinction between (i) extraterritorial impact without extraterritorial action; (ii) unilateral extraterritoriality; and (iii)
multilateral extraterritoriality. Within that discussion we
will also look at the question of Canadian responses to
extraterritorial claims by other nations. Finally, within
the first stage we will consider the policy justifications
that have primarily motivated Canada to act extraterritorially in the past. This aspect of the paper will focus on
criminal law, since that is where Canada has the
strongest history of acting (or not acting) extraterritorially, and therefore where the lessons of the past are
written most clearly. In that discussion we will identify
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the extraterritorial motives of regulating extraterritorial
conduct with a strong connection to Canada, of controlling the public face of Canada, of avoiding lawless territories, and of implementing international agreements
regarding particular offences.
In the second stage of the paper (Parts IV and V), we
will turn to see how (and whether) these distinctions and
the lessons of the past are applicable to the future. Primarily we will do this by pursuing four ‘‘case studies’’ of
areas of law that raise new and challenging issues, and
that might raise different issues than the essentially prohibitory approach of criminal law. In particular we will
consider the challenges posed by extraterritorial issues
relating to (i) the Internet; (ii) personal data protection;
(iii) human rights; and (iv) competition in the marketplace. Finally, we will attempt to draw conclusions.
These will not be precise conclusions of the sort that
Canada should or should not do this or that exact thing,
because the questions are too complex for such ready
answers. But we will provide conclusions in the form of
an analytical framework of questions and considerations,
and the interconnections between them, that should be
taken into account in any circumstance in which the
overarching question of whether Canada ‘‘should’’ act
extraterritorially arises.

II. Analytical Tools and Current
Extra-Territorial Practices
A. Definitions, Distinctions, and
Dichotomies
1. Jurisdiction Defined

T

he term ‘‘jurisdiction’’ has multiple meanings and
layers within meanings, all of which are driven by
the context in which it is used. Generally, the term
‘‘describes the limits of legal competence of a state or
other regulatory authority . . . , to make, apply, and
enforce rules of conduct upon persons’’. 1 Domestically
speaking, jurisdiction is the ability of the state, whether
via the legislature, the executive, or the courts, to exert
power over persons, places, and things.
A discussion of extraterritoriality, however, necessarily engages the state’s ability to exert its power in ways
that involve and affect people, places, and things that are
beyond its borders. In the international legal system, the
state is essentially a territorial entity and each state enjoys
plenary jurisdiction within, and exclusive control over,
its territory. 2 Any act that exerts power outside the state’s
territory necessarily implicates the interests of other
states. This is manifestly so where the act in question
affects another state’s territory or citizens, as this quite
directly engages the interests of the second state. It is
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equally true, however, even for areas such as the high
seas or outer space. Because no state has plenary jurisdiction in these areas, all states have at least a conceptual
interest in regulating the manner in which any state acts,
so as to safeguard their own interests.
Accordingly, the focus here must be on jurisdiction
in its international law meaning. This invokes a number
of different concepts and relationships. Most importantly, jurisdiction at international law ‘‘reflects the basic
principles of state sovereignty, equality of states and noninterference in domestic affairs’’. 3 As explored in the next
section, it is an over-arching concept that provides a legal
basis for states to sort out what each may do, and not do,
in particular outside their borders.
2. Territoriality v. Extraterritoriality: Existence and
Exercise of Jurisdiction at Domestic and
International Law
A crucial step in examining the exception of extraterritorial jurisdiction is understanding its relationship to
the rule of territorial jurisdiction. A state’s plenary jurisdiction over its territory, and every person and thing
upon it, is a function of state sovereignty. Thus, Canada’s
territory is the place where other states may not act in a
sovereign manner, at least not without Canada’s permission. As other states are equally sovereign, it follows that
as soon as Canada exerts power in a way that has effects
outside its borders it will face limitations.
The international law regarding the exercise of jurisdiction by states can be expressed simply: one state’s
exercise of sovereign power cannot infringe upon the
sovereignty of another state or states. This is easy enough
to assert, but nebulous and nuanced in application since
judging where the line is crossed is a complex exercise.
The centre point of conflict will be situations of concurrent jurisdiction, i.e., where two or more states have some
legal claim to exercise jurisdiction over a particular
matter.
Resolution is accomplished in two ways. First, states
can agree on where primary jurisdiction should lie on a
case-by-case basis. For example, if a French citizen commits murder in Canada, France may have a claim to
jurisdiction over its national. However, it is likely to defer
to Canada, since Canada is the state where the act
occurred and probably where all of the evidence is
located, as well as being the more aggrieved state of the
two. Simply because a state notionally has jurisdiction
over a matter does not necessarily mean that it will have
any interest in exercising it.
Second, various principles of jurisdiction have developed in international law to allow states to mitigate the
conflict that may result from concurrent claims to jurisdiction. This system of ‘‘allocat[ing] competences’’ 4 is a
direct outgrowth of the need to manage inter-state relations, and while it is normative in character it is functionalist in practice. As Professor Brownlie has written,
‘‘the sufficiency of grounds for jurisdiction is an issue
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normally considered relative to the rights of other states
and not as a question of basic competence’’. 5
The starting point, of course, is the territorial principle, which renders territorial sovereignty as discussed
above one of the bedrock jurisdictional notions. 6 It is
accepted that a state can assert jurisdiction over its territory, including the territorial sea, internal waters, airspace, and certain maritime zones. In the context of
criminal jurisdiction, two sub-classes of territoriality have
been put into use: subjective territoriality, where a state
has jurisdiction over a criminal act that occurs, or is at
least begun, on its territory but has consequences in
another state; and objective territoriality, where a state
has jurisdiction over an act that is begun in another state
but is completed in the first state.
Since territoriality is the starting point, it follows
that the other jurisdictional principles are extra-territorial. The four principles that have gained some acceptance in international law are as follows:
(a) nationality principle:
States may assert jurisdiction over the acts of their
nationals, wherever the act might take place. This principle is employed more often by civil law countries than
by common law countries, but has equal status with
territoriality as a universally accepted valid ground of
jurisdiction.
(b) protective principle:
States may assert jurisdiction ‘‘over acts committed
abroad that are prejudicial to its security, territorial integrity, and political independence’’. 7 Examples are treason,
espionage, and counterfeiting of state currency.
(c) universal principle:
States may assert jurisdiction over certain criminal acts
that are deemed to be offensive to the international community at large, and thus justify broad jurisdictional permissiveness. Some examples are genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and piracy. Certain treaty regimes
oblige member states that apprehend an individual
accused of the relevant crime to prosecute the individual
regardless of whether there is any connection between
the crime and the apprehending state. If the state does
not wish to prosecute, then it is obliged to extradite the
individual to a treaty partner state that indicates a willingness to prosecute. This kind of mechanism is known
as aut dedare, aut judicare (‘‘extradite or prosecute’’), and
can be distinguished from the broader notion of universality both by its mandatory character and by the fact
that it applies only as between the parties to the relevant
treaty.
(d) passive personality principle:
Some states have, from time to time, and controversially, asserted jurisdiction over acts that injured their
nationals, regardless of territorial location.
Exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, then, is not
necessarily illegal under international law: it depends
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upon whether, in exercising jurisdiction, a state can be
said to infringe upon the sovereignty of another. Each of
the jurisdictional principles above has the effect of legitimizing, to a greater or lesser extent, a state’s claim to
exercise jurisdiction over persons, places, and things
beyond its territory. They are the techniques that states
use to broker conflicts, usually in situations of concurrent jurisdiction.
Recently, the principles described above have been
employed as criteria within a more global test for the
legality of an exercise of jurisdiction: whether there is ‘‘a
substantial and bona fide connection between the subject-matter and the source of the jurisdiction’’. 8 Professor
Brownlie, among others, has posited that state jurisdiction over an extraterritorial act will be lawful where this
primary criterion is met. 9 The essence of this test, usually
expressed in the phrase ‘‘real and substantial connection’’, has appeared in Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence as the test Canadian courts will apply in
deciding whether to take territorial jurisdiction over (i)
criminal acts with both domestic and transnational
aspects, 10 and (ii) civil cases, whether for adjudication or
for enforcement of a foreign judgment. 11 The essential
point is that Canada’s ability to legally exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction is driven by the amount and degree of
connection between Canada and the subject matter in
question, as balanced with the similar connections of
other states to the same subject matter. The propriety
and desirability of so doing is the larger question to
which this study is dedicated.
3. Prescriptive, Judicial and Enforcement Jurisdiction
While the previous section explored the general
legal basis for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, it is
important to distinguish the ways in which this exercise
manifests itself. 12 Legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction
refers to the ability of the legislature to make and apply
laws to subject matter outside the state’s territory;
enforcement or executive jurisdiction refers to the state’s
ability to act in such a manner as to give effect to its laws
(including the ability of police or other government
actors to investigate a matter, which might be referred to
as investigative jurisdiction); and judicial or adjudicative
jurisdiction concerns the ability of a state’s courts to
adjudicate cases with foreign elements.
The international law principles outlined above are
designed to regulate prescriptive jurisdiction, i.e., they
determine where and when a state is competent to make
laws related to extraterritorial subject matter. Notionally,
a state that legislates in excess of its competence at international law is intruding upon the sovereignty of other
states. Practically, however, the potential for conflict will
only arise where there is some chance for the legislating
state to enforce its jurisdiction, e.g., where a state ‘‘acts in
the territory of another state or at least initiates in its
own territory measures that require compliance in a for-
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eign state’’. 13 Enforcement may also occur by way of
domestic courts exercising judicial jurisdiction to decide
that they may seize themselves of a particular matter.
While it may be, as the saying goes, that Parliament
is competent to outlaw smoking on the streets of Paris, 14
if Canada does not attempt to enforce such a law, then it
presents no practical problems. It is possible for a state to
have prescriptive jurisdiction over an extraterritorial
matter but lack the jurisdiction to enforce it. Certainly,
attempts by states to enforce their laws in the absence of
clear entitlement to do so have produced international
strife, a classic example being one state abducting individuals from the territory of another state. 15 Investigation
is similarly circumscribed, and state officials such as
police cannot exercise their executive powers on the
territory of another state without that state’s permission. 16
This being so, Canada has tended to map its prescriptive jurisdiction onto its enforcement jurisdiction —
that is, to legislate extraterritorially only where it is
willing (and potentially able) to investigate and enforce. 17
This is quite true of the criminal law, where enforcement
begins with the individual’s presence in Canada or a
request for extradition that a foreign state will recognize.
It is also true, indirectly, of civil cases, where Canada
enforces the judgments of foreign courts just as it generally expects its own will be enforced.

B. Mechanics of Extraterritorial Action
In this section we address the ‘‘mechanics’’ of extraterritorial action. This involves a consideration of the
purposes for which a state or province might wish to act
extraterritorially. How a state should pursue these
various purposes or objectives will be discussed in Part
II(C), below. A second consideration is the capacity of the
federal and provincial governments to act with extraterritorial effect.
1. Purposes for Extraterritorial Action
The broad purposes for extraterritorial action by
governments can be said to fall under three general
headings: (1) to control or affect the behaviour of individuals; (2) to control or affect the behaviour of corporations; or (3) to control or affect the behaviour of other
states.
A great deal of extraterritorial activity takes place in
the realm of criminal law. In this context, the purpose of
extraterritorial action might be seen as primarily one of
punishing Canadian wrongdoers, or wrongdoers who
find themselves on Canadian territory, for acts they may
have committed outside of Canada. Canada’s recent
child-sex tourism legislation is an example of this. 18
Other examples of punitive extraterritorial laws include
Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes
Act, 19 and various terrorism related offences. 20 These
examples are an illustration of extraterritorial action to
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control or affect the conduct of individuals. A non-punitive example is the imposition of taxes on nonresidents. 21
Individuals may not be the only target of extraterritorial action. The federal government may legislate with
respect to the activities of Canadian corporations operating outside Canada’s borders. 22 Pressure to do so has
increased significantly in recent years. Such regulation
can be in relation to human rights, environmental
impacts, or other facets of the entities’ operations. 23 The
lack of accountability of corporations operating in developing nations is a significant international problem; selfregulation has been, to date, the preferred means of
addressing this behaviour, even though it has been
widely criticized as being insufficient to address the
problems. While national legislation with extraterritorial
effect that establishes norms of conduct with punishment for transgressions has been called for in other jurisdictions, 24 this is only one possible policy option. Other
suggestions have included international treaty-making to
develop reciprocal obligations, independent complaints
mechanisms, 25 and standards-setting accompanied by
rules for government contracting that favour companies
that meet the standards.
In some cases, measures are designed to have extraterritorial reach by influencing the actions of other
nations. For example, the European Directive on Data
Protection 26 specifically provided that EU member states
must legislate so that there could be no transborder
movement of personal data for processing abroad unless
the target country had enacted legislation establishing
substantially equivalent data protection norms. 27
Although such legislation would have no overt extraterritorial reach, the threat of loss of trade as a result of the
Data Protection Directive was a strong motivating factor
behind the Canadian government’s decision to enact the
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). 28
The United States has arguably been very effective
in using multilateral trade treaty negotiations to achieve
harmonization between its own domestic legislated
norms and those of other countries. There have been
numerous instances, for example, where Canadian
courts have identified Canada’s trade treaty obligations
as a reason for choosing an interpretation of Canadian
law that is consistent with that of comparable legislation
in the United States. 29
2. Competence to Act Extraterritorially
An aspect of state sovereignty includes the ability to
legislate with extraterritorial effect. The enforceability of
any such legislation is a separate issue. The Canadian
government is not restrained by the Constitution Act,
1867 from enacting laws with extraterritorial effect, 30
and indeed it has done so on a number of occasions. 31
Often, legislation with extraterritorial effect is enacted to
implement international treaty obligations, which are
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taken on as an exercise of the federal prerogative power
over foreign affairs. In Canada, only the federal government is considered to have the ability to enter into treaties, 32 although there is no explicit constitutional provision that grants such power exclusively to the federal
government. Nevertheless, this power does not give the
federal government the ability to legislate within areas of
provincial competence. 33
Provincial powers on the international stage are limited, although they do exist. The provinces, for example,
may, and frequently do, work cooperatively with the
federal government on issues negotiated internationally.
This is particularly important where the resultant treaty
will impact on areas of provincial legislative competence.
Provinces may also enter into agreements with other
governments so long as these agreements are not
intended to be binding in international law. 34 Such
agreements can be in the form of contracts for goods or
services, or agreements around issues such as reciprocal
enforcement of orders, or recognition of documents such
as drivers’ licences. 35
The governments of the various Canadian provinces
are only competent to legislate with respect to matters
within their own provincial borders, 36 although extraterritorial effects that are merely incidental will be tolerated. 37 This has meant that provinces have little power to
use legislation to alter behaviour in other provinces that
is having an impact within their borders. 38 The Supreme
Court has noted that with respect to provincial competence to legislate with extraterritorial effect, the provinces
are more constrained than is the federal government vis
à vis other states. In the case of the provinces: ‘‘[t]here is a
constitutional limitation on their legislative authority
and there is a common forum to enforce it.’’ 39

C. Ways of Taking Extraterritorial Action
1. Introduction: Factors Affecting the Choice of
Means
Extraterritorial jurisdiction may be asserted by any
organ of government, legislative, executive, or judicial.
For example, extraterritorial power may be expressed by
legislation to criminalize foreign behaviour, executive
orders-in-council to impose trade embargoes on foreign
ports, or judicial orders for the service of process abroad.
It will therefore be convenient to discuss the means of
exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction under the legislative, executive/administrative, and judicial processes separately. As noted above, the ultimate authority for any
branch of government to act extraterritorially depends
on the Canadian constitution and its grants and limitations of power.
In addition to the unilateral assertion of extraterritorial authority, Canada may also exercise jurisdiction
abroad through agreements with foreign states. Such
agreements may take the form of bilateral agreements,
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multilateral treaties, or United Nations obligations. Each
will be described separately.
Just as Canada may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, it must also expect that other states may try to
exercise extraterritorial power that may, deliberately or
coincidentally, have a negative impact on Canada and its
interests. This prospect should moderate Canada’s own
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which ought to
be rational and measured so as not to undercut Canadian diplomacy regarding excessive claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction by other states. In short, the probability
of like, even reciprocal, assertion of extraterritorial
authority by states demands a degree of comity.
At the same time, Canada has found it expedient
and necessary to repulse foreign assertions of extraterritorial power by unilateral, domestic responses for the protection of Canadian interests. These measures will also
be discussed at the end of this section.
2. Choice of Means to Extend Canadian
Jurisdiction Extraterritorially

(a) Legislation
As discussed in Part II(A)(3), Parliament’s extensive
power to prescribe laws will only result in enforcement
when Canada has both jurisdiction over the act and
jurisdiction over the actor. Parliament, however, does not
always address the issue of enforcement, but leaves statutes to be applied by the other organs of government,
namely, the executive and the courts. Hence, extraterritorial legislation exists in three jurisdictional forms:
(i) Jurisdiction over extraterritorial subject matter
only, e.g., the Competition Act, 40 section 46,
which prohibits anti-competitive agreements
made abroad by domestic Canadian corporations, and the child sex tourism provision of
the Criminal Code. 41
(ii) Jurisdiction over extraterritorial persons only,
e.g., the Criminal Code, section 477.1, which
prescribes offences on board Canadian ships
at sea by Canadians and foreigners.
(iii) Jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts by extraterritorial actors, e.g., the Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Act, 42 especially
sections 6 and 8 on offences committed
outside Canada and jurisdiction over the perpetrators.
Legislation is typically mandatory in its prescriptions; i.e., it acts directly to compel performance or to
criminalize misbehaviour or non-compliance. Yet it may
also be used as a persuasive tool by offering a choice of
conduct to its addressees according to their particular
circumstances and election. This is a particularly effective
means to assert legislative influence extraterritorially over
persons who reside or hold property within Canada. For
instance, the taxing power of Parliament might be used
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to persuade Canadian corporations to adhere to Canadian standards of conduct in their commercial and
financial dealings in foreign or developing countries.
In addition, although international law may express
limits on a state’s jurisdiction, as discussed in Part II(A)(2)
above, constitutionally, Parliament may enact legislation
in contravention of international law. The particular circumstances of the occasion will determine how wise or
unwise such a parliamentary course of action might be.
A classic instance occurred in 1970, when Canada
adopted regulatory and managerial powers over large
areas of the Arctic seas by enactment of the Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act. 43 Many states, including the
United States, objected to this assertion of authority as
excessive, in contravention of the international law of the
sea at the time. However, Canada asserted that the environmental fragility of the area demanded special protective laws and it successfully carried this argument in the
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which was then
underway. As a result, the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea 44 contains an article (234) that vindicates
Canada’s legislation.
This discussion of the extraterritorial legislative
power of Parliament does not apply to the provincial
legislatures, which are constitutionally limited to their
own territories. 45 Thus a province that wishes to apply its
legislation extraterritorially may do so only with the aid
of the federal government. Not surprisingly, for political
reasons associated with a province’s concern for its plenary/sovereign authority, this has rarely occurred. It is
also awkward legally to achieve. One attempt may be
seen in the Oceans Act, 46, sections 9 and 21, which
permit the application of provincial laws outside the
province in the coastal waters and other offshore areas
within Canadian (i.e., federal) jurisdiction. The technique
used is to allow the province to request the federal government to pass orders-in-council to extend application
of the provincial statute in question to the offshore area
adjacent to the province. In other words, the provincial
legislation is asserted extraterritorially by fiat of the federal executive. To date, this power in the Oceans Act has
been exercised only once, to apply Prince Edward Island
laws in the area of the Confederation Bridge from Prince
Edward Island to New Brunswick.

(b) Executive Action
While legislative and judicial organs of government
hold inherent powers or direct authority from the Canadian constitution, executive acts of government are
derivative assertions of power. To be valid, all executive
and administrative decisions must be clothed with the
authority of some enabling statute or Crown prerogative
power. Nonetheless, the government of Canada is a principal source of extraterritorial action. The range of means
of taking extraterritorial action is great. For convenience,
the techniques may be divided between unilateral mea-
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sures and participatory acts, which may be either bilateral or multilateral in nature.
Unilateral measures are obviously within the exclusive force and control of the government. They are typically addressed to both natural and legal (i.e., corporate)
persons abroad, whether they are Canadians or foreigners. For example, ministers may make discretionary
orders about foreigners, such as decisions about migrants
under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 47, on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds. Or the government may promote codes of good conduct for
Canadians abroad, such as corporate social responsibility
and human rights standards for Canadian companies
and their officers when investing and operating in developing countries.
Unilateral acts may also be addressed to foreign
states and their governments. Thus, the Canadian government may make demands or requests of a foreign
government for its assistance in reaching persons extraterritorially, as it does when it asks for the extradition of
fugitive offenders. It may also try to influence the actions
and policies of foreign governments to respect Canada’s
rights and interests or to protect Canadians present in
the foreign state. Thus, the Canadian government may
impose economic sanctions against a foreign state or its
property under the Special Economic Measures Act 48 for
grave breaches of international peace and security. Less
forcefully, the government may pursue diplomatic avenues to influence a foreign state’s policies or actions
affecting Canada or to persuade it to desist from
repressing Canadians on its territory. This was the choice
of means of the Canadian government when it made
representations to Syria regarding the mistreatment and
release of Maher Arar.
When extraterritorial issues between Canada and
foreign states are not confrontational, comity and cooperation may then be better ways to resolve them. Such
participatory means to control extraterritorial jurisdiction may be bilateral or multilateral. For example,
Canada has written a number of memoranda of understanding (MOUs), i.e., reciprocal non-binding statements
of policy, with other states bilaterally for the better
administration of practical, everyday matters amongst
them. The arrangement between Canada and the
United States by which the customs and immigration
procedures of one state may be exercised in the ports of
entry of the other is an example of this kind of cooperative, reciprocal solution that conveniences the crossborder travelers of both countries. 49
Multilateral techniques are even better solutions to
conflicting extraterritorial claims because they reflect a
common interest among a broader range of contending
states to resolve the claims. It has proved effective and
efficient for Canada to promote negotiations with foreign states multilaterally to harmonize their national
laws internationally in line with Canadian standards and
interests. Canadian government initiatives of this kind
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within the International Maritime Organisation have
produced uniformity of regulation of the international
shipping industry in many ways to the mutual benefit of
Canadian overseas traders and all other users of its services. Agreement on reciprocal enforcement of arbitral
awards or adoption orders are other examples of multilateral solutions to conflicts of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
However, there is a risk to Canada in pursuing such
multilateral paths — specifically, that other more powerful states, such as the United States and the European
Union, may overpower Canadian influence and turn the
negotiations away from Canadian interests and objectives. In addition, a spirit of cooperation and mutual
benefit is an essential condition for the success of these
participatory techniques of handling extraterritorial tensions. Proof is evident in the failure to date of nation
states, Canada amongst them, to negotiate a treaty to
criminalize terrorism generally. Only specific types of
terrorism have been outlawed internationally because, as
it is quipped, one state’s terrorist is another state’s
freedom fighter.

(c) Judicial Process
Courts, as the interpreters of legislation and
reviewers of administrative action, are frequently the
arbiters of extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, to exercise their authority they must have effective control over
both the acts and the actors involved. In other words, as
discussed in Part II(A)(3) above, they require both prescriptive/subject matter and enforcement/personal jurisdiction. When one of these elements is absent, the courts
themselves have to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction.
This is not a problem when some statute grants such
authority, as discussed under Part II(C)(2)(a) above. But in
the absence of legislative authority, the courts have
employed their inherent powers over their own process
and their control over the application of common law to
fashion judicial principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Canadian courts have crafted tools that allow them
to be seized of matters that, while they have extraterritorial aspects, are treated as exercises of territorial jurisdiction. In criminal and regulatory matters, the courts will
assert subject-matter jurisdiction where enough of the
offence occurred or impacted upon Canadian territory
that Canada can be said to have a ‘‘real and substantial
connection’’ to it. 50 This has allowed courts to assert
jurisdiction over, e.g., breach of an Ontario probation
order that took place in Cuba, 51 a Canadian answering
machine message that referred callers to a hate message
broadcast by way of an American phone number, 52 and
even ‘‘international Internet transmissions’’. 53
The Supreme Court of Canada has taken a cautious
approach to the extraterritorial application of the
Charter in criminal matters, and the general stance has
been to confine the Charter to Canadian territory. In
extradition cases, for example, the Court has drawn
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careful lines: while the Charter (especially section 7)
applies to the domestic extradition process itself, the process and penalties to be imposed on the fugitive in the
requesting state are not subject to Charter scrutiny, as
this would be impermissible extraterritorial application. 54 The fate of the accused in the requesting state is
nonetheless relevant to the section 7 inquiry in Canada,
and the courts have blurred the lines slightly by finding
that extradition to face process or punishment that
would ‘‘shock the conscience’’ of Canadians constitutes a
violation of section 7 by the Canadian state. 55
In cases where evidence was gathered on foreign
soil the Supreme Court has consistently held that the
Charter will not be applied directly to the acts of foreign
authorities — even where those acts are being adjudicated upon at a Canadian trial. 56 In R. v. Cook, 57 the
Court was willing to apply the Charter to the acts of
Canadian police who had questioned a suspect detained
in the U.S., but only because the Canadian police had
obtained the consent of American authorities to do the
questioning, and in those circumstances this would not
interfere with the foreign state’s exercise of its own territorial sovereignty. 58 In other kinds of police co-operation
cases, the courts have sometimes strayed very near an
extraterritorial application of the Charter. In Purdy v.
Canada (Attorney General), 59 for example, the British
Columbia Court of Appeal ruled that an individual was
entitled to a remedy for a breach by the R.C.M.P. of his
section 7 right to full answer and defence — even
though the trial was to be held in Florida.
In civil matters, when subject matter jurisdiction
over extraterritorial events, places, and acts is in issue —
that is, the court is asserted to lack seisin — conflicts of
law rules may be brought into operation. A Canadian
court will decide for itself whether it has jurisdiction and
is a forum conveniens or non conveniens for a dispute
over foreign subject matter. 60 It may even issue an antisuit injunction to prevent a hearing in a foreign court
when it thinks it is the preferable forum for deciding the
case.
When personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants
is lacking, Canadian courts resort to their procedural
powers for solutions. Rules of court are made by the
judges themselves and therefore they vary from province
to province and federally, yet all are sufficiently similar in
design and function for present purposes of discussion.
For instance, in the case of absent defendants, Canadian
courts all have rules for the service of process abroad in
some circumstances. They also have procedural means to
force foreign defendants to come into their territories
and attorn to their jurisdiction. Attachment of the foreigner’s property by Mareva injunctions, security bonds,
and arrest of ships are some of the ways judicial process
may be exerted over extraterritorial defendants.
Even when a Canadian court has complete jurisdiction over the parties and the events in issue between
them, it may face difficulties in proceeding with the
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hearing if the evidence is extraterritorial. If foreign witnesses do not appear voluntarily, a subpoena directed
abroad may be issued, but may also be ignored. An order
for taking testimony abroad is also possible, but it
requires the cooperation of foreign parties for its fulfilment. Similarly, orders for the production of information
and documents abroad, and letters rogatory to foreign
courts are also judicial assertions of extraterritorial
authority that may readily be rebuffed. In criminal matters, these extraterritorial limitations on the judicial process are increasingly alleviated nowadays by inter-state
agreements for mutual legal assistance, discussed below.
In civil cases, no comparable cooperative arrangements
are available to Canadian plaintiffs, who must seek to
satisfy Canadian orders with the aid of foreign courts as
best they can.
Personal status is another matter that presents transnational jurisdictional problems for the courts. International recognition of an individual’s marriage, divorce,
custody, adoption, or legitimacy is crucial to him/her
and thus demands the extraterritorial aid of Canadian
courts. Fortunately national conflicts of law rules usually
afford recognition of Canadian determinations in foreign jurisdictions, and in some instances, multilateral
treaties explicitly provide for such extraterritorial recognition. Even so, disputing parties may seek to challenge
the decision of a Canadian court beyond its reach in a
foreign forum, when restraint and comity become the
only safeguards against conflicting orders determinative
of extraterritorial status. 61
The power of Canadian courts is also subject to
claims of immunity from their personal jurisdiction,
both territorially and extraterritorially. Under international law a foreign state that is recognized by Canada is
a sovereign equal, and consequently it may not be subjected to the Canadian legal system. It follows that representatives of a foreign state acting in their official capacities are inviolable and immune from all Canadian
judicial processes. The practice with regard to foreign
diplomats is well known, of very long standing and now
codified in a multilateral treaty — the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 62 — to which Canada is a
subscribing party. Equally, the President of a foreign state
and the ministers of state are immune from suit in a
Canadian court. These privileges are impressed by customary international law and most have also been
enacted in detail in the State Immunity Act. 63 As a result,
claims against such personages for wrongs committed
extraterritorially may not be pursued when they happen
to come within the Canadian court’s territorial jurisdiction. Equally, a Canadian court may not issue any kind of
process or order against such individuals either within
Canada or without.
Even when a Canadian court has full jurisdictional
control over a case, extraterritorial problems may still
arise over fulfillment of its judgment. In civil actions,
ordinarily the winner of a case against a foreign defen-
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dant must seek to enforce the Canadian judgment
against the foreign loser in the foreigner’s courts. However, on occasion it may be possible to gain a Canadian
court order for execution of the sanction or remedy
when it may be levied against some property of the
foreigner found within Canada, or may be enforced by
compulsory transfer of title to movable property of the
foreigner that is subject to Canadian control, such as the
registration of ships. In criminal cases, judgments against
property are unusual but, when made, are subject to the
same kind of principles. Thus personal property used by
convicted drug smugglers and seized by the police may
be declared by the court to be forfeited to the Crown.
Judgments and court orders for penalties and remedies against an absconding defendant pose other extraterritorial problems. Fines for criminal convictions and
damages in civil suits may not be collectable if the individual leaves Canada, but court orders may be made to
freeze or seize any local assets left behind. Similarly personal remedies of maintenance, specific performance,
injunction and accounting when granted by Canadian
courts against fugitive or foreign defendants may not be
honoured unless the plaintiff can enlist the aid of a
foreign court to enforce them.

(d) Bilateral Agreement
Rather than act unilaterally, Canada’s extraterritorial
objectives may be more readily achieved through cooperation and agreement with foreign states. Bilateral
agreements may be ad hoc arrangements or permanent
treaties. Seeking the ad hoc consent of foreign authorities
is a quick and straightforward way to deal with particular
extraterritorial incidents, 64 but the reverse is also possible: a foreign government might invite Canada to provide police or military aid in its territory. In either case,
the permission of the foreign state allows Canadian
authorities to act in a ‘‘sovereign’’ manner without
infringing upon the sovereignty of the host.
Permanent treaties for the allocation of extraterritorial authority come in several forms, including the following:
(i) Standing agreements for mutual assistance
and cooperation over extraterritorial matters.
Classic examples are the Canada–U.S. Agreement Regarding the Application of Their
Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws 65 and the Canada–U.S. Treaty on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. 66
Their titles explain their intended functions.
The latter has been implemented by the
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
Act, 67 for reciprocal application in favour of
U.S. extraterritorial requests to Canada.
(ii) Standing agreements for reciprocal extraterritorial authority. These treaties differ from
class (i) above in that they are mutual and
cooperative and also have exactly reciprocal

37

terms. An example is the Exchange of Notes
(i.e., treaty) between Canada and the United
States regarding the application between
them of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 68 which is given effect in Canada by the
Visiting Forces Act. 69
(iii) Standing agreements for mutual extraterritorial authority. In other words the two states’
parties exercise a shared jurisdiction over a
transnational activity. One example is the
International Joint Commission over use and
abuse of Canada–U.S. boundary waters pursuant to the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty. 70
Another occurs under NAFTA when
bi/trilateral panels hear claims between states
parties, and when Canadian courts review
arbitral awards of Chapter 11 claims by U.S.
or Mexican corporations of unlawful expropriation in each other’s territories. 71

(e) Multilateral Agreement
Multilateral treaty-making offers the greatest opportunity for the widest resolution of conflicting assertions
of extraterritorial jurisdiction. They might be:
(i) Multi-party treaties for reciprocal extraterritorial authority. These are not yet common,
though one example is the UN Fish Stocks
Agreement. 72 Under article 21 on enforcement of regional fisheries rules, Canada may
exercise boarding, inspection, and detention
powers against foreign fishing vessels on the
high seas, as regulated under the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act. 73
(ii) Multi-state organizations for mutual extraterritorial authority. These involve concerted
action on identified and widespread extraterritorial problems affecting a certain area of
law by member states of a standing body. An
example is Canada’s participation in a variety
of intergovernmental organizations that
maintain (i) bodies that have powers to prescribe and/or implement standards/norms for
states’ parties (e.g., the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change, which concluded the Kyoto
Protocol); (ii) units for inspecting, monitoring,
verifying, and reporting compliance of states’
parties with the organization’s rules and standards (e.g., International Atomic Energy
Agency oversight of nuclear facilities); and/or
(iii) organs with supranational decisionmaking authority (e.g., the World Trade
Organization Dispute Settlement Board).
A special form of intergovernmental organization is
the United Nations Organization (UNO). Because of the
universality of its functions and membership and the
uniqueness of its supranational powers in some areas,
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UNO deserves special mention. Multilateral attention by
UNO to extraterritorial concerns has become a very significant part of its work as the central world body in the
current transition to globalism in so many fields of
human interest and endeavour. As a member of UNO,
Canada bears responsibility, along with all the other
member states, to fulfill its duties under the UN Charter.
From time to time, these may include collective measures of the organization or, in other words, extraterritorial action by Canada in association with other member
states in the name of UNO. Under UNO authority,
Canada may act extraterritorially when:
(a) Canada implements UNO obligations incurred
under a mandatory decision of the Security
Council to sanction foreign states, for instance
by orders made under the United Nations Act; 74
(b) Canada voluntarily participates in measures
authorized by Security Council resolution
under the United Nations Charter Chapter VII,
i.e., peacekeeping missions to foreign states.
3. Responses to Excessive Assertions of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Against Canada

(a) Legislation
Canada may enact statutory reactions to foreign
assertions of extraterritorial power, in order to protect
and/or provide remedies to affected Canadians. These
often take the form of ‘‘blocking’’ and ‘‘clawback’’ statutes. An example is the federal Foreign Extraterritorial
Measures Act, 75, which permits the Attorney General,
upon finding that Canadian trade and commercial interests are adversely affected by a foreign state’s actions:
(i) to prohibit natural or legal persons in Canada
from (a) following that state’s executive directives and judicial orders, or (b) supplying any
requested or required documents and information;
(ii) to prohibit the enforcement of any judgment
of that state’s courts in Canada;

of the terms of any choice of forum clause, and (ii) the
benefit of Canadian law irrespective of any contracted
choice of foreign law.

(b) Executive Action
Acting through its delegated powers, the executive
can respond in several ways to jurisdictional overreach
by foreign states. One mechanism is the discretionary
ministerial order, available under many different types of
legislation. A good example is the Extradition Act, 79
which empowers the Attorney General to refuse to extradite a person in Canada to a foreign state on several
grounds — including where the requesting state is exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over the offence that
forms the basis of the request. 80
In its exercise of the federal foreign affairs power,
the executive may also make diplomatic responses to the
foreign state’s extraterritorial actions. These can be ‘‘soft’’
or conciliatory options (e.g., ambassadorial representations, state-to-state negotiations) or ‘‘hard’’ options (e.g.,
unilateral withdrawal of trade and aid). The executive
can also make orders for countermeasures, i.e., temporary
non-performance or suspension by Canada of treaty obligations to a foreign state commensurate with the injury
suffered from its violative extraterritorial acts.

(c) Judicial Process
The judiciary has neither the range nor the scope of
power enjoyed by the legislature and executive branches
to respond to extraterritorial acts by foreign states, and
tends to be leery of adjudicating with regard to foreign
states or actors. As guardians of their own process and
the ultimate arbiters of applicable law, however, the
courts are empowered to dispose of foreign extraterritorial claims (usually involving private actors) that tread too
far into Canadian jurisdiction, normally through the use
of conflicts of law principles.

Similar legislation has been enacted by some provinces, e.g., Ontario’s Business Records Protection Act, 76
and Quebec’s Business Concerns Records Act. 77

The courts may impose procedural restrictions
upon parties, e.g., the rejection of foreign choice of forum
and choice of law clauses in multi-national contracts.
This power is not commonly exercised, given the
common law’s reluctance to interfere with contractual
relations any more than necessary. 81 They may also
impose remedial restrictions, e.g., refusal to recognize
and/or enforce foreign court judgments and arbitral
awards — though they do so subject to treaty obligations 82 which usually limit this power.

Parliament may also enact legislative overrides of
foreign choice of forum and/or choice of law clauses in
transnational contracts. An example is the Marine Liability Act, 78 by which Canadian shippers/exporters and
importers/consignees of goods by sea may be given (i)
the choice of a Canadian court or arbitration regardless

Further, conflicts of law principles ordain that Canadian courts, though they may acknowledge a decision of
a foreign state’s court, will not generally assist in the
execution of the foreign state’s penal, fiscal and confiscatory laws, nor any foreign law that contravenes a fundamental rule of Canadian public policy. 83

(iii) where the judgment is executed against local
assets of the Canadian defendant in the foreign state, to permit the Canadian defendant
to sue the foreign plaintiff in the Canadian
courts for recovery of an equal sum.
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(d) International Agreement
All of the bilateral and multilateral treaties mentioned in Part II(C)(2)(d) and (e), above, operate reciprocally, affording the same rights of extraterritorial actions
by foreign treaty partners where Canada asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction against them. The treaties, however,
also set limits on the exercise of extraterritorial authority,
which provides reciprocal protection for Canadian inter-

ests. Should a foreign state breach a convention’s negotiated standards by an excessive exercise of extraterritorial
power, Canada may respond defensively by any of the
techniques listed above in Parts II(C)(3)(a) and (b). It may
also respond offensively with ‘‘equal and opposite’’ measures, i.e., by exercising similar extraterritorial jurisdiction
against the foreign state.

Table 1 — Means to Extend Canadian Jurisdiction Extraterritorially
ET = Extraterritorial
Type of
Action
Legislation

Executive
Action

Type of Jurisdiction

Example

Comments

Prescr iption
1) Over E T subject matter
2) Over E T persons
3) Over E T acts & actors

Child sex tour ism
Offences on board Canadian ships
Cr imes against humanit y

Led inter nat’l initiative
Avoids lawless terr itor y
Pursuant to universal jur isdiction

— prescr iption

Imposition of economic sanctions

Usually pursuant to a decision of an
IGO

— enforcement

Discretionar y immigration decision

Int’l law respects national choices

2) Bilateral: prescr iption & enforcement

Can.–US cross border customs
procedures

Mutual Administrative convenience

— prescr iption

Harmonization of nat’l laws

Convenient and eff icient multilateral
solutions

— enforcement

Reciprocal enforcement of arbitral awards

Prescr iption & Enforcement
1) Unilateral:

3) Multilateral:

Judicial
Process

Prescr iption & Enforcement
1) Under legislation: prescr iption &
enforcement

Cr imes against Humanit y Act

Pursuant to universal jur isdiction

— prescr iption over E T subject matter

Forum non/conveniens

Eff icient court process

— prescr iption over E T persons

Ser vice of process abroad
Limited E T application of Canadian
Charter

Limited use
Restraint in face of foreign sovereignt y

— enforcement over E T persons

Seizure of propert y in Canada

Limited means of enforcement abroad

1) Ad hoc assistance

Consent for RCMP to operate in US:
Cook case

Administrative convenience

2) Standing Assistance

Can.–US Treat y on Mutual Legal
Assistance

Administrative convenience

3) Reciprocal E T author it y

Can.–US Status of Forces Agreement

Jur isdictional clar it y

4) Mutual E T author it y

1909 Boundar y Waters Treat y

Mutual solutions

UN Fish Stock s Agreement

Exceptional extension of jur isdiction

2) By inherent powers

Bilateral
Agreement

Multilateral
Agreement

Prescr iption & Enforcement

Prescr iption & Enforcement
1) Reciprocal E T author it y:
2) Mutual E T author it y:
— prescr iption
— compliance
— adjudication

IGOs, e.g.:
Kyoto Protocol by COP-3 of UN FCCC
IAEA inspections
W TO Dispute Settlement Board

Mutual solutions
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Table 2 — Canadian Responses to Excessive Foreign Assertions of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Type of
Action

Type of Jurisdiction

Legislation

Prescr iption

Executive
Action

Example

Comments

1) Blocking

Foreign Extraterr itor ial Measures Act

Exceptional

2) Overr ide

Arbitration choice under Mar ine
Liabilit y Act

Uncommon

1) Requests

Diplomatic overtures

Frequent

2) Orders

Counter measures

Uncommon

Enforcement

Refusal to extradite

Discretionar y

Anti-suit injunctions

Uncommon

Rejection of choice of law clauses

Infrequent

Prescr iption

1) Decisions
Judicial
Process

Prescr iption
1) Procedural restr ictions

Enforcement
1) Remedial restr ictions
International Prescr iption & Enforcement
Agreement

Non-enforcement of foreign judgments

Infrequent

See treaties in Table 1 — all operate
reciprocally to protect, as well as to
extend, Canadian Jur isdiction

Mutual solutions

III. Policy Justifications for
Extraterritorial Action

I

n Part II we explained the conceptual framework
behind extraterritorial jurisdiction, set out its general
mechanical operation, and identified the governmental
entities competent to exercise it. We also explored the
means by which it is exercised — both proactively, in
promotion of Canadian interests and policy objectives,
and reactively, in response to what Canada views as
excessive extraterritorial claims by foreign states.

In light of the foregoing, we submit that an essential
distinction can be drawn between three choices of
means: (i) extraterritorial impact without extraterritoriality; (ii) unilateral extraterritorial action; and (iii) multilateral extraterritorial action. Here, we will examine the
approach to each of these issues that Canada has taken
in the criminal law sphere. This area is a useful one to
examine because it is the area in which Canada has the
longest history of extraterritorial action. Although
Canada is not necessarily bound to continue as it has
proceeded in the past, a clear understanding of the motivations that have guided exercises in extraterritoriality
until now will be useful.
We suggest that in criminal law there are four
observable motivations for acting extraterritorially. They
are: (1) to regulate extraterritorial conduct with a strong
connection to Canada; (2) to control the ‘‘public face’’ of
Canada; (3) to avoid lawless territory; and; (4) to implement international agreements regarding particular
offences.

A. Regulating Extraterritorial Conduct
With a Strong Connection to Canada
There are some Criminal Code provisions that
make behaviour illegal even if some of the prohibited
conduct takes place outside Canada. These offences fall
into two different categories, and it is worth distinguishing between them.
In one category can be found offences that are not
intended to have an extraterritorial impact at all, but
which ignore the fact that certain aspects of the offence
are not territorially based in Canada, because that fact is
of no real consequence to the offence. The simplest
example of this category is possession of stolen goods.
Section 354 of the Code makes it an offence to
possess property that was obtained from a crime in
Canada or from ‘‘an act or omission anywhere that, if it
had occurred in Canada, would have constituted an
offence punishable by indictment’’. This provision, and
others like it, should not really be understood as extraterritorial provisions. They are not aimed at reducing thefts
or other offences outside Canada: rather, the point is that
if an accused in Canada is in possession of stolen goods,
it is irrelevant where the goods were stolen from. In
many offences, phrases like ‘‘whether in or out of
Canada’’ serve the same function as the phrase ‘‘directly
or indirectly’’ as a modifier of ‘‘apply force’’ in the assault
provisions — not to add a consideration, but to remove
one. Falling into this category would be offences such as
procuring illicit sexual intercourse (section 212(a)), operating unseaworthy vessels (section 251), making a false
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document (section 366), gaming in stocks (section 383),
brokers illegally reducing stock (section 384), money
laundering (part XII.2) offences, and bigamy (section
290). We do not regard these offences as genuinely relevant to an extraterritorial discussion.
There are some specific offences, though, which
actually aim at prosecuting behaviour that occurs
outside Canada’s borders: treason and high treason (section 46(3)), offences under the Security of Information
Act (section 26), 84 passport and certificate of citizenship
offences (sections 57 and 58), offences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 85 (section 135), and
offences under the Citizenship Act involving false representations concerning citizenship (section 30). 86
These offences for the most part fall within our
extraterritorial impact without extraterritoriality category. The real focus of these offences is the impact on the
territory or integrity of Canada, but to achieve that goal
there is an incidental need to extend the territorial scope
of the offence.

B. Controlling the Public Face of Canada
A relatively small number of offences make behaviour by some Canadians illegal when it occurs overseas.
Specifically, public servants, while acting as employees in
a place outside Canada, are bound by the Criminal Code
(section 7(4)), and services offences in the National
Defence Act 87 or the RCMP Code of Conduct apply to
offences committed outside Canada. Formerly, those
employed on Canadian ships overseas were bound by
Canadian criminal law, but that provision has been
repealed. Finally, section 269.1 of the Criminal Code
makes torture by a Canadian ‘‘official’’ illegal wherever it
occurs.

C. Avoiding Lawless Territories
A significant policy justification for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction is that there is no competing territorial claim by another state. Not only does Canada not
interfere with any other state’s sovereignty in such circumstances, but the danger of lawless territories is
avoided. One of the oldest extraterritorial provisions in
the Criminal Code, therefore, relates to piracy, an offence
occurring on the high seas, and which is an offence
whether committed in or out of Canada (section 74(2)).
In more recent times, outer space has raised the same
issue of a jurisdictional gap, and Canada now also asserts
(in some circumstances) jurisdiction over offences on the
international space station (sections 7(2.3)-7(2.34). Similar
provisions cover some offences committed on aircraft
and on ships or fixed platforms outside the continental
shelf of any country (sections 7(1), (2), (2.1), and (2.2)).
Finally, section 477.1(e) extends jurisdiction to offences
committed ‘‘outside the territory of any state’’.
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The nature of the jurisdictional claims is not identical in each case, however. In some instances, such as
piracy or offences on aircraft, ships, or fixed platforms,
Canada will assert jurisdiction over anyone committing
the offence. However, for certain hijacking and terrorist
offences section 7(2) of the Criminal Code adds the additional condition that the accused later be present in
Canada, while offences committed on fixed platforms
can be prosecuted if the individual simply turns up in
Canada, and the provisions regarding piracy and offences
on aircraft do not speak to the presence of the accused at
all. Hence, although Canada will prosecute anyone for
these offences, in some circumstances it might not be
able to seek anyone’s extradition to face charges in
Canada. In other cases, such as outer space (sections
7(2.3) and (2.31)) and section 477.1(e) of the Criminal
Code, the claim is more limited. In the latter case
Canada claims jurisdiction over the lawless territory for
offences committed by Canadians: in the former, over
offences by and against Canadians.

D. Implementing International
Agreements Regarding Particular
Offences
In the first 1892 Criminal Code, with the arguable
exception of piracy, there were no extraterritorial provisions based on international agreement. By the time of
the 1982 Revised Statutes there were a significant
number, and today there are perhaps twice as many such
provisions as in 1982. To the extent that Canada’s extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction has grown, therefore, the
growth has occurred entirely in this category of international agreement. Canada has signed agreements to prosecute in the case of particular types of crimes. As a result,
the Criminal Code contains extraterritorial provisions
dealing with offences on aircraft, offences committed in
relation to an ‘‘air navigation facility used in international air navigation’’, and now also to civil airports
outside Canada, personal offences against an ‘‘internationally protected person’’, hostage taking, offences
involving nuclear material, explosives or other lethal
devices, offences against United Nations or associated
personnel, financing terrorism, child sex tourism, and
torture by Canadian officials overseas. Provisions now in
the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act,
which were formerly in the Criminal Code, permit prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity
that occurred outside Canada.
While none of these policy categories is watertight,
what they demonstrate in common is Canada’s significant interest in regulating extraterritorial conduct where
it is both in Canada’s interest to do so, and either does
not interfere with, or in fact promotes, certain regimes
within the international legal order.
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IV. Substantive Areas of Current
Concern: Sample Case Studies

H

aving outlined in Part III the possible policy justifications for existing assertions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction by Canada in the field of criminal law, it is
appropriate now to consider some sample areas of law —
specifically, the private, civil and regulatory areas — in
which transnational issues are of growing public concern
and attention. Discussion of these topics will be used to
illuminate one or more features that are generally
required for the efficacious exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, as well as to enquire how the extension of
extraterritorial powers might be useful and effective in
resolving each of them.

A Extraterritoriality and the Internet
As an interconnected, global network of networks,
the Internet permits the transmission of data around the
world at great speed. Unlike other conventional media,
the Internet is highly interactive and it is this interactivity that sets it apart. The Internet can be used as a
medium for commercial transactions at the business to
business or business to consumer level. It can be used to
transmit commodities in the form of digitized content, it
is a vehicle for gaming activities, and it facilitates or
serves as conduit for a wide variety of criminal conduct.
All of this activity occurs by means of data being transmitted through a network that may traverse many
national boundaries.
The Internet has raised many difficult legislative
and regulatory issues for national governments. These
issues arise in diverse contexts because of the unique
character of the Internet as a medium.
(i) As a means of transacting business. In some cases,
the Internet is the vehicle by which sales are advertised
and concluded, with conventional methods being used
for the delivery of goods. The purchase of books or other
products by Canadians from offshore online vendors
raises issues of taxation of offshore consumer spending
and consumer protection. In some instances the subject
matter of the transaction may be a commodity that is
illegal, heavily regulated or subject to different regulatory
or safety standards in Canada. Concerns over legality and
regulation run both ways. Trans-border sales also raise
issues about the infringement of foreign laws by Canadian-based businesses selling offshore. 88
(ii) As a mode of delivery of goods, services or content. It is also possible for a transaction to be completed
and the content or subject matter of the transaction to
be delivered online. This is the case with the
downloading of music, video, audiobook, and other such
content. It is also the case where content is streamed over
the Internet as in webcasts, Internet radio, and so on.
Such transactions raise issues for copyright law, particularly where the exchange is not authorized (as is the case
with peer to peer file sharing). Thorny issues of taxation
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are raised where imported goods never pass through
customs, but rather are delivered as data over the
Internet.
In some situations, where the content and the actual
transaction occur over the Internet, competing state
interests are more directly engaged. This is the case with
conduct that has been typically heavily regulated by governments, such as broadcasting, or which is illegal. Thus,
Internet gambling poses a challenge, as do things such as
offering pornography for sale online (where different
states may have different laws regarding obscenity), or
communicating hate speech. 89 Issues may also arise
where content is considered perfectly acceptable in
many jurisdictions, but illegal in a few. For example,
certain political speech is banned in some countries and
accessing or contributing to such speech on the Internet
may actually be a criminal offence.
(iii) As a vehicle for criminal activity. Some Internet
activities, such as the distribution of child pornography,
are simply illegal, and are generally illegal in most states.
The Internet has become a vehicle for a wide range of
criminal activity, including fraud, conspiracy, terrorism,
money laundering, or other organized crime activities.
It is clear that the challenges of the Internet with
respect to the extraterritorial application of laws will
arise in a range of contexts. In many cases, the situation
does not require the development of new principles or
rules, but rather requires the application of existing principles in a highly interconnected world. As Binnie J.
noted in SOCAN v. CAIP, the issues ‘‘[play] out against
the much larger conundrum of trying to apply national
laws to a fast-evolving technology that in essence respects
no territorial boundaries’’. 90 Many issues therefore
involve coming to terms with the concept of ‘‘territory’’
in an age of digital networks.
1. Territoriality in the Internet Context
In SOCAN, the Supreme Court of Canada considered, inter alia, the issue of whether music transmitted to
Canada over the Internet from a server located outside of
Canada was communicated to the public by telecommunication in Canada. The Copyright Board had come to
the conclusion that a work was communicated to the
public by telecommunication when it was accessed (in
other words, when the transmission was initiated). The
Court accepted this conclusion. However, the Copyright
Board had then concluded that since the communication occurred at the point of access, a work was not
communicated to the public by telecommunication in
Canada unless the point of access (the server that hosted
the content) was located in Canada.
Binnie J., writing for the majority of the Court,
rejected this latter position, ruling that it was ‘‘too rigid
and mechanical a test’’. 91 He wrote: ‘‘An Internet communication that crosses one or more national boundaries ‘occurs’ in more than one country, at a minimum
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the country of transmission and the country of reception’’. 92 Binnie J. argued that this more expansive
approach to the ‘‘location’’ of Internet acts was necessary
because any other approach ‘‘would have serious consequences in other areas of law relevant to the Internet,
including Canada’s ability to deal with criminal and civil
liability for objectionable communications entering the
country from abroad’’. 93
The Court framed its approach in terms of the
extraterritorial application of laws. Binnie J. noted that
the reach of Canada’s laws was not limited to communications of content that take place within Canada’s borders. He began his analysis by stating that the principle
of territoriality should be generally respected in order to
avoid chaos. Thus, Parliament must be assumed not to
legislate with extraterritorial effect ‘‘in the absence of
clear words or necessary implication to the contrary’’. 94
He noted as well that copyright law reflects ‘‘the implementation of a ‘web of interlinking international treaties’
based on the principle of national treatment’’. 95 Thus,
Binnie J. wrote:
The applicability of our Copyright Act to communications that have international participants will depend on
whether there is a sufficient connection between this
country and the communication in question for Canada to
apply its law consistent with the ‘‘principles of order and
fairness . . . that ensure security of [cross-border] transactions
with justice’’. 96

Binnie J.’s opinion that a ‘‘telecommunication from
a foreign state to Canada, or a telecommunication from
Canada to a foreign state, ‘is both here and there’’’ 97 is
consistent with an approach that looks for a ‘‘real and
substantial connection’’ to Canada for determining
whether a communication to the public by telecommunication has taken place in Canada. In his view, the ‘‘real
and substantial connection’’ test developed by the courts
for determining when it is appropriate to take jurisdiction is relevant and useful, and ‘‘is sufficient to support
the application of our Copyright Act to international
Internet transmissions in a way that will accord with
international comity and be consistent with the objectives of order and fairness’’. 98
The majority decision in SOCAN is confusing in
that it refers to the extraterritorial application of the
Copyright Act, suggesting that Canada has taken prescriptive jurisdiction over matters outside its borders. In
fact, by applying the ‘‘real and substantial connection’’
test formulated by the Court in Libman, 99 and articulated in subsequent decisions, 100 Binnie J. is actually
determining, based on the territoriality principle, that
the offence in question had sufficient connection to
Canadian territory. This is the essence of Libman —
defining the scope of the territoriality principle. As
LaForest J. writes in Libman:
I might summarize my approach to the limits of territoriality in this way. As I see it, all that is necessary to make an
offence subject to the jurisdiction of our courts is that a
significant portion of the activities constituting that offence
took place in Canada. As it is put by modern academics, it is
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sufficient that there be a ‘‘real and substantial link’’ between
an offence and this country, a test well-known in public and
private international law. 101

The Internet requires a revisiting of the principle of territoriality, as many transactions or interactions over the
Internet are ‘‘both here and there’’. The search for a ‘‘real
and substantial connection’’ to Canada’s territory with
an eye to international comity would suffice to deal with
many situations that might arise. Thus, in Citron v.
Zundel , 102 the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal
applied the provisions of the Canadian Human Rights
Act 103 where offensive content was hosted on a server
located in California. In that case, the content provider
and the complainants were both located in Canada. In
SOCAN, the majority correctly notes that a finding of
‘‘real and substantial connection’’ in any given case ‘‘will
turn on the facts of a particular transmission’’. 104
It is clear that in SOCAN, the issue boiled down to
coming up with a means of determining the limits of
territoriality in the Internet context. Indeed the issue in
the case was not whether proceedings could be brought
against offshore actors. Rather, the Court was more concerned with how to capture Canadian actors. As such,
the case raised issues of objective territoriality. 105 If the
act complained of occurred entirely outside Canada,
then there is insufficient linkage to Canadian territory.
But if the communication is ‘‘both here and there’’, then
there is a hook to capture the conduct of Canadians who
are involved in the communications, even if only as
recipients.
It seems that in many cases the Internet will not
really change the basic principles of territorial jurisdiction or extraterritoriality. However, the increased use of
the Internet for a growing range of activities may
demand that this assessment of the substantiality of links
to Canada’s territory occur more frequently. The result
may be not so much an increase in extraterritoriality as
an increase in the number of situations where there is a
need to consider the limits of the concept of territoriality. While ‘‘cyberspace’’ has been conceptualized by
some as a different or separate space, the reality is that
most activities in ‘‘cyberspace’’ can be linked to a particular national territory or territories by the usual factors
such as the physical location of the participants, their
nationalities, the location of facilities or equipment, and
the location of victims or recipients of content.
That being said, it is clear that certain kinds of acts
or offences are ones that lend themselves more to challenging notions of territorial boundaries. In the ‘‘offline’’
world, criminal conspiracy has always raised the possibility that the plotting of an offence may occur in one
jurisdiction with the actual offence carried out in
another. The Internet may simply (and significantly)
increase the number of offences (civil or criminal) that
cross borders or involve actors in multiple jurisdictions.
Communicating a work to the public by telecommunication over the Internet might involve a person who
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communicates in one jurisdiction, and members of the
receiving public in a variety of jurisdictions. The same
occurs with defamation, where publication on the
Internet may occur in one jurisdiction, while readers of
the content (and thus the reputational harm) may be
located in multiple other jurisdictions. It is not surprising
that there has been a significant amount of litigation
around Internet defamation, with courts in many jurisdictions seeking to establish those criteria that will establish a ‘‘real and substantial connection’’ to the court’s
home jurisdiction. 106 In the criminal context, the result
in R. v. Starnet Communications International Inc. 107
strongly suggests that to avoid prosecution under
Canada’s Criminal Code for illegal gaming activity over
the Internet, it is necessary to sever links to Canada so as
to avoid any ‘‘real and substantial connection’’. 108
It should be noted that there are parallels in other
jurisdictions to the Canadian approach to territoriality
and the Internet, 109 and Canadian courts have, in some
cases, accepted and enforced orders of foreign courts on
the basis that there was a substantial connection to the
foreign jurisdiction. Thus in Somerset Pharmaceuticals
Inc. v. Interpharm Inc., 110 an Ontario Court gave effect to
letters rogatory issued by a Florida Court in a case
involving the online sale of pharmaceuticals to the U.S.
The Court accepted that the importation of
pharmaceuticals was carried out in a manner that violated U.S. laws. While it acknowledged that a court
should not enforce letters rogatory where it would be
contrary to public policy in Canada, MacDonald J. found
this to be an appropriate case in which to lend assistance
to a foreign court.
The dispute over the activities of iCraveTV also provides an illustration of parallel approaches in other jurisdictions. In that case, a Canadian company picked up
broadcast signals from the United States and retransmitted them over the Internet. This retransmission
activity was legal in Canada if the appropriate retransmission licence was acquired, and the company sought
the appropriate licence. However, the Internet-based
retransmission (unlike cable retransmission) had the
capacity to penetrate the U.S. market, and major copyright holders in the United States sought to enjoin the
company’s activities. They were successful in obtaining
an injunction in the United States to restrain the activities of iCraveTV on the basis that by effectively retransmitting their content to U.S. residents via the Internet, its
activities infringed their copyrights in the United
States. 111 Although iCraveTV was prepared to argue that
its activities were legal in Canada, the parties ultimately
entered into a settlement agreement wherein iCraveTV
agreed to cease its activities.

cases, the issues raised are ones related to the limits on a
state’s power to regulate conduct outside of its borders,
even where there is a territorial impact. Thus, for
example, Quebec’s Office de la langue française imposes
French language requirements only on the Web sites of
businesses that sell products in Quebec and advertise
them on the Web site of a business situated in
Quebec. 112 Legislation regulating the language of business in the province cannot have extraterritorial effect
even when the Internet allows offshore or out-of-province companies to sell merchandise to consumers in
Quebec. This, again, is consistent with traditional principles regarding extraterritoriality. As between Canadian
provinces, in Earth Future Lottery, 113 a group based in
PEI obtained a licence in that province to operate a
lottery, which it planned to establish online. The
Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the decision of the
PEI Court of Appeal that in order to be lawful, the lottery
would have to be conducted in the licensing province.
The Court found that there was a difference between
conducting a lottery in a province and conducting one
from a province. It ruled the Internet lottery scheme to
be illegal, noting: ‘‘The global market extends far beyond
the boundaries of this province and is therefore outside
the territorial limitation imposed by sub-section
207(1)(b).’’ 114 The provisions of the Criminal Code that
permitted provinces ‘‘to conduct and manage a lottery
scheme in that province’’ were designed ‘‘to ensure that
the activities of lotteries exempted from criminality
would be strictly confined territorially’’. 115

2. Legislative/Prescriptive Jurisdiction and the
Internet
Not all issues raised by the Internet turn on the
location or locations of the offensive conduct. In some

A particular challenge when dealing with legislative
or prescriptive extraterritoriality in the Internet context
is that the vast majority of statutes in Canada were first
enacted at a time when the Internet, or even the scope of

In Thorpe v. College of Pharmacists of British
Columbia, 116 a pharmacist who had been disciplined for
preparing and exporting prescription drugs for persons
in the United States, and therefore was not qualified to
practise medicine in Canada, appealed the decision of
the College of Pharmacists on the basis that the relevant
section of the Pharmacists Act was ultra vires the province as it had impermissible extraprovincial effect. The
Court of Appeal rejected this argument. Gibbs J.A.
expressed the view that:
I am satisfied that it is a reasonable and proper concern
of a provincial legislature to ensure that professional persons
under their regulatory authority so practice their profession
as to ensure that the standards that apply within the province apply with equal force to conduct within the province
which has extra-provincial reach. 117

The bottom line, in this as in other cases involving
Internet-based activity, is that the same principles that
govern extraterritorial action by the federal government
and provincial governments in other contexts will apply.
The challenge is both to adapt those principles to the
Internet context, and to come to terms with the
increasing volume of such issues.
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Internet-based activity, was never contemplated. This legislation was therefore enacted without having Parliament
consider whether extraterritorial powers were necessary,
or in what circumstances they should be exercised. A
major challenge for courts faced with interpreting this
legislation is the need to determine, as a matter of statutory interpretation, whether it is appropriate to read the
legislation, or particular provisions, as conveying extraterritorial authority. This is perhaps the issue that caused
the most confusion in the SOCAN decision. LeBel J., in
dissent in that case on the issue of extraterritoriality,
framed the issue to be decided as ‘‘whether Parliament
did in fact intend that section 3(1)(f) of the Act apply
extraterritorially’’. 118 As argued earlier, the real issue was
how to interpret the concept of territoriality in the
Internet environment. Nevertheless, LeBel J.’s approach
was to ask whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Copyright Act was intended by Parliament to
have effect outside Canada’s borders. His answer was
‘‘no’’. He went on to consider the territorial question: ‘‘. . .
when does a communication occur within Canada for
the purpose of section 3(1)(f)’’. 119 His answer was a categorical ‘‘where it emanates from a host server located in
Canada’’. 120 The reason for his choice loops back around
to the issue of extraterritoriality: ‘‘The only question is
whether Parliament intended the Act to have effect
beyond Canada.’’ 121 With respect, this conflates the principles of extraterritoriality with the enquiry into territoriality.
It would seem that LeBel J. made the right enquiry
in the wrong context. Where the issue is whether a
particular act has sufficient connection to Canada to give
Canadian courts jurisdiction over the matter, the inquiry
into Parliament’s intent to legislate extraterritorially is
not really relevant. However, where the issue is whether
a law confers the power to assert jurisdiction over persons, actions or events clearly outside Canada’s borders,
the question does become one of interpreting the intent
of Parliament as expressed in the legislation. As LeBel J.
indicates, in such cases courts will look for clear evidence
of an express or implied intent on the part of Parliament
to act extraterritorially. 122 As noted earlier in this paper,
such instances are rare, and have, in the past, tended to
map onto one of the four principles governing extraterritorial action that have gained some acceptance in international law. 123
3. Implementing Treaties, Other International
Agreements, and International Cooperation
It is to be expected that some of the most difficult,
significant or recurring trans-border Internet issues will
be dealt with through international cooperation of one
kind or another. There are already a number of examples
of international co-operation or collaboration with
respect to trans-boundary Internet issues. In some cases,
international treaties have been signed that reflect new
norms that will govern certain matters that arise on the
Internet. The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), 124 and
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WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) 125
are examples of such instruments. In other contexts, the
challenges of monitoring and regulating conduct on the
Internet have led to cooperation and collaboration in
policing activities. For example, recent international
action resulted in a crackdown on Internet copyright
piracy that involved cooperation between police forces
in 11 countries. 126 In 2003, the Virtual Global Task Force
was created by an international alliance of law enforcement agencies to tackle issues of the online abuse of
children. 127 Similar cooperation may be available where
the activity being carried out online is of a highly criminal nature, such as plotting terrorism, money laundering, or other organized crime activities. 128

B. Personal Information Protection
Personal information protection is, in many ways, a
new area of regulation that owes its genesis to the twin
phenomena of digitization and the Internet. The fairly
recent enactment of personal information protection legislation in Europe and in Canada was prompted by the
fact that technology enabled the collection, processing,
mining, and transmission of data at a speed and on a
scale that was entirely unprecedented. As noted earlier in
this paper, Europe acted first, and its Data Protection
Directive had a direct impact on Canada’s decision to
enact its own data protection legislation. 129 Canada’s
own Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act (PIPEDA) 130 established norms for the
collection, use, and disclosure of personal information in
the course of commercial activity. It also gave the federal
Privacy Commissioner powers of oversight, including the
power to investigate complaints and conduct audits. The
Act gives individuals the ability to bring a complaint to
court only after receiving the Commissioner’s report on
the investigation of the complaint.
In 2004, a complaint was filed with the Privacy
Commissioner against Abika.com, a company based in
the United States. The company operates as an online
data broker, providing clients with a variety of data services, including background checks or psychological
profiles of individuals, unlisted phone numbers and cell
phone numbers, details of incoming and outgoing
phone calls from a given phone number, and so on.
Although located in the U.S., the company offered this
service to Canadian clients and in relation to Canadian
subjects. In response to the complaint, an investigation
was commenced by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC). The investigator contacted the company,
which refused to provide information about the Canadian-based sources for the data they provided on Canadian data subjects. The Commissioner’s office then notified the complainant that they could not proceed with
the complaint as they did not have ‘‘the requisite legislative authority to exercise our powers outside of
Canada’’. 131 Assistant Privacy Commissioner Heather
Black wrote:
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There is nothing explicit in PIPEDA to suggest that it
was meant to apply outside of Canada or that the powers of
the Commissioner would extend beyond Canada’s borders.
According to leading case law, where the language of a
statute can be construed so as not to have extraterritorial
effect, then that construction must be adopted. It seems
clear that this Act should not be construed to have extraterritorial effect. In the absence of any express or implied legislative intent, I must conclude that PIPEDA has no direct
application outside of Canada. 132

for the target organization. The intertwining of ‘‘real and
substantial connection’’ issues with issues of investigative
jurisdiction is plainly evident in the following statement
by Ms. Black: ‘‘we have no means of identifying — let
alone investigating — those who would represent a
Canadian presence for this organization and further,
have no ability to compel an American organization to
respond.’’ 135

Ms Black noted that the OPC was genuinely concerned
about the operations of data-brokers such as Abika.com,
and that they had sought advice from the federal government as to the protocols that would allow them to investigate cases of this nature. Ms Black also noted that the
OPC was exploring mutual cooperation issues in various
international fora, that they were seeking to obtain
authority through a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), or
some other arrangement with the United States, and
that they had raised the issue with the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission. 133

It is difficult to untangle the two threads. From a
procedural point of view, the OPC is correct that it
would have no powers to carry out its investigation in
the United States absent some form of MOU or MLAT.
Its investigative powers under PIPEDA are thus useless
outside of Canada’s borders, and clearly Parliament
cannot be presumed to have intended that they would
have such application.

The complainant in the case has since sought judicial review of the decision of the OPC not to proceed
with the complaint. In the application for judicial review,
the applicant argues that there is a real and substantial
connection between the subject matter of the complaint
and Canada. In particular, it is argued that the Commissioner erred by ‘‘[a]pplying a test of ‘extraterritorial effect’
to determine her jurisdiction to investigate the complaint when the appropriate test to establish jurisdiction
is the ‘real and substantial connection test’’’. 134 In the
alternative it is argued that the ‘‘real and substantial connection’’ test was wrongly applied.
The case is an extremely interesting one. It seems
clear from the letter from the OPC that two separate
threads of argument are interwoven in a justification for
not taking jurisdiction in this case. On the one hand,
concerns about the lack of investigative authority outside
Canada’s borders are reflected in the discussion of the
various means by which cooperation can be sought to
permit such investigations to proceed. Certainly, in the
criminal law context, the fact that Canada might seek to
exert substantive jurisdiction over an individual will not,
in and of itself, give Canadian police forces the power to
carry out an investigation in the United States, nor will it
empower a court to issue search warrants for premises
located in the United States. Jurisdiction over subject
matter does not confer investigative jurisdiction. This is
linked to the prescriptive jurisdiction/enforcement jurisdiction dichotomy discussed earlier.
At the same time, the OPC seems to also argue that
it lacks substantive jurisdiction, although it ties this lack
to its inability to investigate in the United States. The
OPC stated that Abika.com had not responded to its
request for information, and that therefore the OPC had
no information as to the company’s Canadian-based
sources. In doing so, it was clearly tying its ability to
exercise jurisdiction to some kind of Canadian presence

The issue of the intent of Parliament has been
addressed earlier under the section on the Internet.
There the point was made that much Canadian legislation has been enacted in a context where Parliament
could not have contemplated the effect of the Internet
on the issues governed by the legislation. Thus, the
inquiry into Parliamentary intent with respect to extraterritoriality is made more difficult. It is more difficult
still to argue that, in the case of personal information
protection, Parliament was unaware of the Internet context. PIPEDA currently makes Canadian-based organizations responsible for ensuring that third parties to whom
data is transferred for processing comply with the stipulated privacy norms. 136 It is possible that it was assumed
by Parliament that in cases where offshore data processors violate PIPEDA norms, the Canadian based organization that supplied the data to them for processing
would be held accountable. Parliament may not have
contemplated that offshore businesses operating in an
unregulated environment would themselves be engaged
in collecting data about Canadians and selling it back to
them through an Internet-operated business. If this is the
case, then the issue is one that would not have been in
the contemplation of Parliament, and thus opens more
room for argument about whether PIPEDA should be
given some extraterritorial effect.
However, if the law were to be given extraterritorial
application, the issue would quickly become whether
there was any investigative or enforcement jurisdiction
to support this extraterritorial application. Certainly
without an MOU or MLAT, it is unlikely that effective
action could be taken to either investigate the complaint
or to enforce any order that might flow from a proceeding against the U.S. company in Canada. The case
raises a further issue: given that the U.S. currently has no
comparable personal information protection legislation,
the U.S.-based company is not violating any relevant U.S.
norms. Absent mutuality of values between two jurisdictions, it is unlikely there will be the kind of reciprocity
necessary to support any assertion by Canada of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
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The issue here could also be approached as one of
territoriality. In other words, the question would be
whether there was sufficient connection to Canada’s territory to support an assertion of jurisdiction over the
complaint by the OPC. If a company in the U.S., in the
course of commercial activity, has collected and disclosed the personal information of Canadians, without
their consent, to other Canadians located in Canada, it
has likely violated the normative provisions of PIPEDA.
In this scenario, there is a possibility that a ‘‘real and
substantial connection’’ could be found, even absent a
physical link between the offending company and
Canada. The complainant whose rights were infringed is
located in Canada; the personal information in question
was disclosed in Canada without her consent. To the
extent that the data flowed to and from Canada at different points in time may simply mean that the offence
is ‘‘both here and there’’. Nevertheless, even if jurisdiction were asserted, it would have largely symbolic effect
without either a Canadian presence against which a
remedial order could be made, or some form of reciprocal enforcement agreement. Absent the ability to
enforce the decision, any proceeding would have only
symbolic value.
There are three broad options here. The first would
be for the courts to make a determination about territoriality on the facts of the case. In other words, they would
consider whether there is a sufficient connection to
Canada, using a Libman-type approach adjusted to take
into account the realities of the Internet and trans-border
data flows. The ability to properly investigate the matter
or to enforce any decision could either be considered as
extraneous to the ‘‘real and substantial connection’’ test,
or a practical consideration to be placed in the balance.
The second option would be to determine that
PIPEDA was intended to have extraterritorial effect.
Some evidence of this would be required, or, at the very
least, an argument would have to be made that the issue
of extraterritoriality was beyond the contemplation of
Parliament at the time the legislation was drafted, and
that therefore it is an issue that the courts must resolve
absent any clear indication. In either event, the courts
must begin with the presumption that Parliament did
not intend to act extraterritorially. Courts should be
leery of interpreting legislation to have extraterritorial
effect without considering the contexts generally
accepted in international law as supporting some form of
extraterritorial action. These, discussed earlier in Part
II(A)(2), include the nationality principle, protective principle, universal principle and the passive personality principle. In instances such as this, where passive personality
seems the best fit, courts must be particularly sensitive to
issues of comity and the implications of opening the
door to other countries asserting jurisdiction in the same
manner.
The third option would be to pursue extraterritorial
reach through a process of negotiation of bi- or multi-
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lateral agreements. In other words, the federal government could attempt to negotiate MOUs, MLATs or
some other form of accord that would allow for the
investigation and enforcement of PIPEDA actions
outside Canada’s territorial boundary where the actions
of a foreign organization are injurious to Canadian individuals or interests. While it could be argued that the
basis for action of this kind is a ‘‘real and substantial
connection’’ to Canada’s territory, the fact is that there
will be contexts where finding a ‘‘real and substantial
connection’’ will be meaningless without negotiated
arrangements to permit Canadian authorities to reach
inside another jurisdiction. In such circumstances the
‘‘real and substantial connection’’ is not a justification for
action based on the principle of territoriality. Rather, the
‘‘real and substantial connection’’ is the motivation that
underpins the decision of the federal government to seek
a negotiated resolution to a problem that exceeds its
territorial reach. The ‘‘real and substantial connection’’
used in the context of territoriality should not be confused conceptually with the connection that prompts a
government to pursue various extraterritorial measures.

C. Human Rights
Traditionally, states have been much quicker to
exercise public, especially criminal, law powers extraterritorially than they have been to involve themselves in
private law matters abroad. For instance, the readiness to
assert jurisdiction over international criminal acts and
actors beyond the state’s territory has not been matched
by the same level of concern for the victims of such
criminal activity. Canada is no exception to this practice.
Even though such a criminal attack on the person will
nearly always constitute a violation of human rights,
remedies for individuals so injured extraterritorially are
rarely accessible.
Nor did international law previously demand them.
States were only required to treat foreigners within their
borders with a minimum international standard of treatment, which in practice was very minimal indeed. 137 Part
of this obligation was the provision of an adequate legal
system for the resolution of any private claims for personal injury that an individual might have. Canadian
court practice readily met this requirement for claims by
persons, whether Canadian or foreign, for violations of
their human rights suffered within Canada but paid, and
still pays, scant attention to the claims of victims beyond
its borders.
However, at least two of the justifications for exercising extraterritorial criminal law powers discussed in
Part III above might also be used to assert civil court
authority over extraterritorial abuses of human rights. To
this extent, criminal and civil law concerns over extraterritorial application mirror each other. Put another way,
the analytical model developed from the experience of
extraterritorial assertions of criminal jurisdiction could
also be used to justify the extraterritorial exercise of civil
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court powers. This important point will become evident
from the following discussion, first, of the duty to implement obligatory international agreements and, second, of
the right to regulate extraterritorial conduct with a
strong connection to Canada, as each may be applied to
the extraterritorial protection of human rights. Thereafter two impediments to projected extraterritorial
action by Canada will also be addressed.
First, growth in the international protection of
human rights since 1945 has arguably now attained a
level of protection that obliges a state to ensure the
protection of human rights for all. Certain, if not all,
human rights are erga omnes rights. 138 The phrase ‘‘erga
omnes ’’ simply signifies that the right is one that all states
have a legal interest in protecting. Put conversely, the
correlative obligation on the state directly responsible for
the protection of such a right is an obligation owed to
the international community as a whole. On this argument Canada has a duty to uphold erga omnes human
rights for everyone and has a legal interest in their protection everywhere.
The scope of this obligation has been elaborated in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), to which Canada is a party. 139 Article 2(1)
requires Canada ‘‘to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognised’’ in the ICCPR. This duty includes the
further obligations found in article 2(3) to provide competent adjudicative processes for claims of abuse and
effective remedies for victims that are actually enforced.
Thus, the rights in the ICCPR, such as the rights to life,
liberty and security of the person and freedom from
arbitrary arrest, detention, slavery, and torture (arts. 6–9),
are owed to everyone under a reciprocally binding treaty
between Canada and the other state parties. As a consequence, Canada must, and does, provide appropriate protections and remedies for abuses of human rights within
its territory. One extraterritoriality question is whether
Canada may hold to account other states that do not live
up to their treaty obligations in their territories. But
whether Canada does or does not pursue foreign states
for their treaty violations, a second extraterritoriality
question is whether it should ensure remedies also to
victims of abuse extraterritorially who find their way to
Canada. In other words, ought Canadian courts to be
open to claims of human rights abuses that constitute
violations of erga omnes obligations whether committed
by Canadian citizens or foreigners, whether perpetrated
against Canadians or foreigners, and whether committed
within Canada or elsewhere?
Secondly, if the argument for obligatory jurisdiction
over extraterritorial violations of human rights is not
sufficiently convincing by itself, there is still the additional proposition that Canada might act in this way
because it has a real and substantial interest in the worldwide protection of human rights. At least two powerful
legal arguments may call for affirmative action.
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The first is an argument that parallels the assertion
of criminal law jurisdiction over international offences
and offenders. To the extent that gross violations of
human rights are proscribed as genocide, torture, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes and their perpetrators
are subject to the universal jurisdiction of states, so their
victims ought to be able to access a remedy against their
violators universally. Since Canada has accepted and
implemented its international obligations to prosecute
the perpetrators of international crimes simply on the
basis of custodial jurisdiction (detention), 140 it arguably
has every reason to afford similar access to Canadian
courts for the victims of extraterritorial abuse in pursuit
of the remedies and recompense legally due to them.
Secondly, as part of Canadian concern for an
orderly international society, asserted above, Canada
undoubtedly has an interest in upholding human rights
worldwide. In particular, there is a real and substantial
involvement of Canada in cases of abuse of human rights
abroad that concern victims of Canadian origin and refugees or stateless persons who come to Canada. Moreover,
Canada’s promotion internationally of the principle of
responsibility to protect populations at risk from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity 141 is grounds to argue that Canada has a real
and substantial involvement in all violations of human
rights everywhere. Hence, on this approach also, it could
be argued that Canada might provide access to its courts
for victims to pursue justice and enforceable remedies
for extraterritorial violations of their human rights.
However, both arguments for opening Canadian
courts to actions for extraterritorial human rights violations face at least two procedural inhibitions. One is the
conflicts of law principle of forum non conveniens. This
may be a valid limit to curial jurisdiction in an ordinary
tort claim for, say, negligence by a German in running
down an Italian in France, because Canada plainly has
no connection at all with such an incident. However, the
policy objectives behind the principle may have less
force where the claim in tort (whether in negligence or,
especially, trespass to person) is for a violation of an
internationally respected human right since, as explained
above, Canada does have a serious interest, if not an
obligation, to assist such victims. Since the creation and
application of this principle is a judge-made rule of conflicts of law (private international law), it may readily be
amended or refined either by statute or by the judges
themselves, if so minded.
A second impediment in many instances is likely to
be a claim of immunity by the defendant. Human rights
abuses are frequently authorized or carried out by state
officials during the time of their active duties. Since international law, by reason of the sovereign equality of states,
accords immunity to one state from the jurisdictional
authority of another, representatives of the state in certain circumstances are also immune and inviolable in
foreign countries and their courts. This is not the place
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to engage in the details of the international law of state
immunities. 142 Suffice it to note that Canadian courts are
inhibited from asserting jurisdiction over a foreign state’s
high officials for many acts while in office or, after
leaving office, for past acts done in the capacity of their
office. After leaving office, such a public figure is no
longer immune from suit for any acts done previously in
a private capacity. 143
The issue of puzzling concern in international law
today is the scope of so-called private acts of public officials. Torture, for instance, when authorized by a public
official is so far removed from the purposes of public
office that, as the House of Lords has held, the official
cannot claim immunity from prosecution after leaving
office. 144 However, in Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 145 the Ontario High Court and the Court of Appeal
did not follow this lead of the House of Lords regarding
criminal responsibility when faced with a civil liability
claim. While they acknowledged the customary international law, even peremptory or jus cogens, status of the
rule against torture, they decided that the defendant’s
claim to immunity was a separate matter regulated by
the Canadian State Immunity Act which, though it
allows exceptions, does not include one for torts
involving human rights violations outside, as opposed to
inside, Canada. 146 This reading of the Canadian law
seems to overlook Canada’s obligation under the ICCPR,
discussed above, to afford remedies for abuses of protected human rights. Article 2(3) specifically requires
Canada ‘‘to ensure . . . [to a victim] an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed
by persons acting in an official capacity’’.
In any event, if desired, an appropriately worded
amendment of the State Immunity Act could easily overturn the impediment of immunity to private suits for the
limited and justifiable purpose of providing access to
justice and remedies for victims of violations of internationally respected human rights.

D. Competition in the Marketplace
The pursuit of freer trade amongst market economy
countries internationally has always been paralleled by
market regulation to maintain fair competition nationally. Unfortunately, from the early days of the first competition legislation — the U.S. Sherman Anti-Trust Act 147
— it has become apparent that competition in the
domestic market can readily be subverted by combinations, cartels and price fixing agreements made extraterritorially. National desire to reach corporate colluders
extraterritorially has therefore been a longstanding feature of competition law that remains unresolved to this
day.
The favoured technique of national legislatures and
courts is to assert an extended territorial jurisdiction on
account of the impact of the extraterritorial anti-competitive act upon local markets. This is an application of socalled objective territorial jurisdiction, as discussed above
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in Part II(1)(b). This approach was the source of the
notorious U.S. ‘‘effects doctrine’’ by which, in extreme
cases, any commercial conspiracy, collusion or combination abroad that had however slight an effect on American trade was ground enough to assert the application
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and to impose fines,
orders, and penalties on the foreign (corporate) defendants 148 in the expectation they would be honoured, if
not enforced, in the foreign jurisdictions. When they
were not, these sanctions have frequently been executed,
as occasion permits, against any assets of the foreign
defendants that can be found within the United States.
This practice is not peculiar to the United States.
For instance, Canada, Germany, 149 and the European
Union 150 all have competition laws that may be applied
extraterritorially. The Canadian Competition Act 151 specifically proscribes corporate acts within Canada in furtherance of anti-competitive arrangements concluded
outside Canada that would be illegal by Canadian law if
made within Canada. Similarly, the former Foreign
Investment Review Act 152 was used against mergers of
foreign corporations that affected control over Canadian
companies. 153
Attempts to defuse the resulting international tensions by lowering jurisdictional expectations through the
application of more careful criteria that require substantial domestic impact from extraterritorial corporate conduct have not been successful. An American test of
‘‘direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect’’ on
U.S. commerce 154 did not inhibit the U.S. Supreme
Court from finding that several U.K. companies acted in
violation of the U.S. anti-trust laws even though their
actions were legal under the law where they were committed in the United Kingdom. 155
National responses to foreign assertions of extraterritorial power over economic competition have been
equally determined. Australia, 156 Canada, France, 157 and
the United Kingdom 158 have all enacted statutes that, in
varying ways, reject another state’s extraterritorial acts
and orders. In Canada, the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act 159 grants the Attorney-General of Canada
powers to block the orders of a foreign court that
adversely affect significant Canadian interests in international trade or infringe upon Canadian sovereignty. Further, where the Attorney-General has exercised these
‘‘blocking’’ powers, a Canadian company that has suffered the exaction of damages abroad may claw them
back through suit in a Canadian court. Notably, such
‘‘clawback’’ actions are themselves extraterritorial acts
against foreign defendants.
These tit-for-tat ripostes are not helpful. Indeed, they
are destructive of international trade and the commercial
confidence on which transnational transactions depend,
a negation of international order amongst nation states,
and a denial of the comity between governments that is
so essential to the smooth functioning of international
relations. Fortunately, realistic attitudes have prevailed
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and solutions through intergovernmental cooperation
have been sought. One example is the Canada–United
States Agreement Regarding the Application of Their
Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws. 160
But a general solution to the problems of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in economic affairs has not yet been discovered. These problems have become much more pressing
since the GATT, and now the WTO, have reduced the
authority of member states to erect trade barriers by
national laws, thus opening the international marketplace to freer commercial competition but without supporting it with transnational constraints on anti-competitive behaviour. Given the institutional authority and
legal powers over international trade that reside in the
WTO, a multilateral solution would seem to be the
obvious choice, if agreement can ever be reached. 161
Fundamental to the continuance of these extraterritorial problems is the inescapable inequality of commercial power and the diversity of economic policies
between trade partners. Fair competition in the international marketplace requires a regulatory regime that may
be applied extraterritorially when necessary. The lack of
an effective system, nationally or internationally, illustrates an important prerequisite to every exercise of
extraterritorial power. An acceptable competition
regime, either unilaterally asserted or multilaterally
agreed, has not been achieved on account of the lack of
mutuality of national interests and the absence of comity
and reciprocity in legal perspectives.

V. Conclusion: Towards An
Analytical Framework for
Deciding Upon Extraterritorial
Action
A. The Road Since Travelled

I

n Part II we drew a number of distinctions, and raised
a number of considerations to which Canada must
advert in considering how to act extraterritorially. To
restate them briefly, those issues are:
(i) What jurisdiction Canada may claim to assert
compared to the jurisdiction it does assert in practice —
or put another way, what extraterritorial jurisdiction our
domestic law claims compared to the extraterritorial
jurisdiction international law will acknowledge and support;
(ii) By what mechanisms Canada can attempt to act
extraterritorially — whether through punitive legislation,
regulatory rules governing behaviour outside Canada’s
borders, licensing or other fees imposed on actors, lobbying with other governments to negotiate treaties or
reach informal understandings, or agreeing on procedural rules that allow Canadian procedures or judgements to be carried out beyond Canadian territory;
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(iii) Against whom or what Canada can effectively
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction — whether against
people, places, acts or events, or some combination of
them.
We also addressed in Part III the situations where
Canada asserts criminal extraterritorial jurisdiction and
thus we developed a set of policy justifications for such
Canadian actions. To these, we added in Part IV a crosssection of transnational activities evidently in need of
legal regulation, but where extraterritorial issues arise.
In this concluding section, Part V, we will pursue
more closely the connections between those various
issues, policies, and problem areas, through the lens of
what we view as the key functional consideration that
will underpin any inquiry regarding extraterritorial
action: enforceability. We will then propose an analytical
framework for such inquiries, in the form of a template
that can be used to help decide when it would be appropriate as a means of executing Canadian policy on future
occasions for Canada to act extraterritorially. No single
answer or correlation can be proposed, but the relevant
considerations that might guide the choice of one means
or another, or one subject matter or another, can be laid
out.

B. Enforceability: The Key Criterion
As a general observation, one ought to expect a high
degree of correlation between the actual enforceability of
a law and whether it is worth prescribing the law. That
said, ‘‘enforceability’’ is a malleable concept. For example,
although prohibitory laws (such as criminal law) do have
some purely symbolic value, as a general rule, they are
useful only to the extent that there is a real possibility of
punishing those who do not comply with the law. Thus,
although there is symbolic value in declaring that a racist
motive will be an aggravating factor in sentencing an
accused for a crime, that symbolism depends on the fact
that the rule can actually be put into effect in individual
sentencing decisions. When criminal laws have nothing
but symbolic value, however, they are likely to erode
rather than build confidence in the justice system, since
they quickly come to be seen as paper tigers.
Where Canada’s laws state that particular actors
must refrain from doing particular things, it would be a
rare instance for that law to be sensible if Canada did not
also have the ability, in some fashion, to back up the
prohibition. Whether Canada acts alone or acts in
unison with others to enforce the law is of little consequence, but that it is enforceable does matter.
Much the same is true, though perhaps to a lesser
extent, of regulatory laws that do not prohibit, but which
require certain behaviour: the payment of licensing fees,
taxes, or compliance with other requirements. In general
Canada would shy away from purely symbolic but unenforceable laws. However, in this context ‘‘enforcement’’
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might be seen more broadly. It might be reasonable to
wait longer: in effect, an obligation to pay licensing fees
or something similar can be ‘‘sat on’’ longer while
waiting for an effective enforcement opportunity, such as
the return of the obligee to Canada.
‘‘Enforceability’’ becomes an even broader concept
when one considers regulatory laws that demand certain
standards, but where the focus is not necessarily on fees
or taxes. The policy objective might be to have corporations in other countries comply with standards that
Canada sees as acceptable in data protection, for
example, or to require fair hiring and employment practices by overseas companies. Canada’s enforcement
method in such cases might be through incentives: for
example, the negative incentive of closing Canadian
markets to companies that do not comply, or the positive incentive of offering government contracts to those
that do.
Alternatively, Canada might also in such circumstances, or in other regulatory contexts (e.g., environmental regulation), lobby with other governments to try
to produce an international consensus around the Canadian view of how matters ought to be arranged. Perceived broadly, this is a kind of extraterritoriality, in the
sense that the Canadian legislative approach will have
effect in other countries that also adopt the same
approach.
It is worth observing the way in which these various
concerns can be seen reflected in the exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction we have described earlier. In
that context, the enforceability question can be understood as two questions: when can Canada effectively
prosecute without international assistance; and when
can Canada rely on other countries to recognize
Canada’s jurisdictional claim over the crime and extradite an accused person.
We noted offences such as treason or passport
offences, which aim at conduct occurring outside
Canada’s borders. These offences, though examples of
unilateral extraterritoriality, all fairly obviously invoke
national security interests, and at international law
would be easily justified under the protective principle.
That principle does not quite so obviously explain section (4) of the Criminal Code, which deems conspiracies
to commit an offence in Canada to have occurred in
Canada even if the conspiring actually occurred outside
the country. Even in that case, though, international law
is likely to support Canadian jurisdiction over the
matter, since the conspiracy would be an injury to
Canada, despite no real effects being felt, and would be
of little impact on or interest to the state where the
conspiracy occurred. In that event, although Canada
might not have physical control over the accused in the
sense that they are likely to be outside the country, most
other nations would recognize as legitimate Canada’s
request for extradition. 162
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We also noted that a number of offences are aimed
at controlling Canada’s public face abroad. These provisions are also unilateral extensions of Canadian jurisdiction, but would, for the most part, be supported at international law by the nationality principle. One should not
conclude, though, that the nationality principle is therefore a strong policy justification for extraterritoriality in
Canadian law. In the vast majority of occasions where
Canada could rely on the nationality principle, it has not
done so. Further, in these offences the real justification is
not that the offender was a Canadian national, but that
the offender was acting in an official capacity. Note, for
example, that a person employed outside Canada under
the Public Service Employment Act 163 (and therefore
captured by section 7(4) of the Criminal Code) need not
be a Canadian citizen. The Law Reform Commission
has noted that this provision therefore potentially
exceeds Canada’s jurisdiction recognized at international
law: a request for extradition based on it might well be
refused. 164 Somewhat oddly, Canada is likely to benefit
in this context from a coincidental overlap between the
‘‘public face’’ policy Canada wishes to assert and the
‘‘nationality’’ jurisdiction international law will recognize. Where Canada seeks to have its own nationals
extradited to face trial on torture charges, for example, it
is more likely to succeed than if extradition is sought of a
non-national who acted at the direction of a Canadian
official, though the torture offence claims to capture
both. 165
The third motive for extraterritoriality we noted,
avoiding lawless territories, is also likely to be enforceable, though the nature of Canada’s claim is not identical
in each case. In some instances, such as piracy or offences
on aircraft, ships, or fixed platforms, Canada will assert
jurisdiction over anyone committing the offence —
though for some, the accused must later be present in
Canada for jurisdiction to crystallize, while for others,
jurisdiction is immediate upon the offence but the
offender is more likely to be prosecuted by a treaty
partner with more connections to the event than to be
extradited to Canada. Hence, although Canada will prosecute anyone for these offences, it will not always seek
anyone’s extradition to face charges in Canada. These
provisions should therefore not be conceptualized as an
extension of Canada’s arm so much as a shouldering of a
shared burden: all nations have jurisdiction over these
offenders, and Canada will prosecute those of them who
end up here. Piracy has long been recognized at customary international law as subject to universal jurisdiction, and in the case of the other offences, Canada is
signatory to various treaties in which it has agreed with
other nations to share the prosecutorial task in this way.
These are, therefore, examples of multilateral extraterritorial legislation.
In other cases, such as outer space and section
477.1(e) of the Criminal Code, 166 the claim is more lim-
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ited. In the latter case, Canada claims jurisdiction over
the lawless territory for offences committed by
Canadians: in the former, over offences by and against
Canadians. The claim regarding astronauts is again multilateral, in that it arises from international agreement,
and Canada’s claim under section 477.1( e ) over
Canadians outside the territory of any state, although
unilateral, by definition affects no other state’s sovereignty. Any state having such offenders is therefore likely
to honour an extradition request, since it does not compete with their interests.
Finally, we noted the many particular offences that
are now subject to claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction
by Canada: hostage taking, offences involving nuclear
materials, child sex tourism, and so on. The provisions
implementing these agreements at first glance present a
bewildering array of extraterritorial claims, variously
asserting jurisdiction when the offence was on a Canadian ship or aircraft, by a Canadian, against a Canadian,
by a person later present in Canada, against Canadian
facilities, and others. Various international law principles,
including the passive personality principle, the protective
principle, or universal jurisdiction could justify the individual claims. The central point to recognize is that the
reason the jurisdictional claims vary from offence to
offence is that the Criminal Code provisions concerned
implement different international agreements, and in
each case Canada has exerted exactly the jurisdiction
that it has agreed with other countries that it will exert.
In other words, the area in which there has been
growth in extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction not only
over the last 20 years, but over the last 100 years, has
been where advance international cooperation has
resulted in a specific agreement to deal with a particular
type of offence in a particular way. Virtually everything
in this category, therefore, is an instance of multilateral
extraterritorial legislation.
The one exception worth noting in this context is
that the extraterritorial provisions in the Criminal Code
dealing with terrorism offences encompass the specific
treaty obligations Canada has taken on, but also unilaterally extend a claim of jurisdiction over ‘‘terrorist activity
committed outside Canada’’ (section 7(3.75)) which is
broader than those treaties. Perhaps given the exceptional nature of the response to terrorism by Western
nations in the past few years, this could still be presented
as loosely by international agreement, but it is certainly
not by the explicit terms of any treaty or protocol. That
exception aside, reliance on multilateral cooperation to
buttress its extraterritorial criminal claims has stood
Canada in good stead, and will likely continue to do so.
The prognosis for extraterritorially enforceable jurisdiction in the criminal field does not necessarily apply in
the regulatory and private law context. Of obvious difference, there is little substantiated experience on which to
rely or on which to found an analysis such as has been
made in the criminal context. The template must inevi-
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tably be wholly predictive. Even so, a number of propositions may be ventured with relative confidence.
First, the prescriptive power of Canada over regulatory matters and civil law claims and remedies is readily
sustainable, if not well understood, but, secondly,
Canada’s enforcement ability is limited. Since the issues
over prescription and enforcement are different between
regulating the Internet or competition in the international marketplace and advancing protection of personal
information and human rights, they will be discussed
separately.
As can be seen from the discussion in Part IV, the
ability to regulate use of the Internet raises many of the
same issues that have long been contested by states over
their national competition laws. The Internet offers a
wholly new kind of international marketplace which,
like commercial competition, requires a structural
regime to ensure its efficient and legitimate use. Canada,
like other states, has good grounds to extend Internet
and competition standards and laws against those who
engage in misconduct outside Canada that has a substantial impact on others within Canada, or vice versa.
The legal basis for prescribing controls is the territorial
principle of jurisdiction, extended in either its objective
or subjective modes, because the target transactions are,
by their nature, both ‘‘here and there’’. However,
although transnational use of the Internet or anti-competitive activity may affect some interests in Canada, the
first difficult question is whether the impact is substantial enough to claim jurisdiction. As seen in Part IV, the
international community is not agreed on the degree of
impact within a state’s territorial jurisdiction that is necessary to legitimate an assertion of its laws extraterritorially. Further, the novelty of the Internet is causing
impacts in new and unanticipated ways. These difficulties presage continuing uncertainty, if not outright disagreement, between states as to when the exercise of prescriptive powers are acceptable. As a result,
extraterritorial authority in these fields of regulatory concern is unlikely to be enforceable without multi-state
agreement, for instance through a multilateral convention, that either sets international standards or harmonizes national ones.
Extraterritorial efforts to protect personal information and human rights give rise to their own distinctive
prescriptive and enforcement issues. To the extent that
these efforts are directed extraterritorially against the
conduct of Canadians — for instance the prospective
imposition of human rights standards on Canadian corporations in both their Canadian and foreign operations
— there can be no objection at international law to such
prescription because Canada is entitled to expand the so
far limited use of its authority over nationals. On the
other hand, the fact that Canada’s use of the nationality
principle has been limited reflects some kind of policy
choice, and departure from previous practice merits
inquiry as to what this policy choice is, and why it
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should change. Certainly, however, the protection from
extraterritorial abuse of Canadians and others who are
present in Canada but who are not nationals may be
expected to cause rather greater concern in foreign
capitals.

standards of remedial responsibilities and mutual legal
assistance between states in the sphere of civil law, as has
already begun in the transnational administration of
criminal justice.

At bottom, Canada’s desire to protect members of
the public amounts to an export of its public values.
Many of these are expressed in law in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Indeed, the Canadian
courts have already had some experience with the exportation of the Charter itself, as described in Part II(C)(2)(a).
They have taken a measured approach, extending the
application of the Charter abroad where Canadian
officers were involved with the consent of foreign
authorities, but not pressing Charter protections where
similar, but not the same, standards of due process
obtain in the foreign state.

C. Constructing Extraterritoriality: An
Analytical Framework

Though this kind of guarded extraterritorial application by the courts may have been sufficient and wise in
the particular circumstances, the asserted jurisdiction is
also more generally supportable. The public values
Canada exports by prescribing rules and procedures for
the protection of individuals within its legal system are
entirely justifiable so long as they are encompassed, and
therefore backed, by the network of customary and conventional international human rights obligations on all
states. While there is room for argument around the
interpretation of these rights in particular situations,
there is no gainsaying their core protections. Hence
Canada has a sound basis for promoting protection prescriptively.
However, the enforceability of Canadian regulation
and protection of personal information and human
rights is much less sure. In the criminal and quasi-criminal context, extradition offers a possible, even probable,
route to enforcement against a fugitive abroad; but no
such mechanism is available outside this context. Canadian courts may grant service of civil process, order the
production of documents, or subpoena witnesses abroad,
but their directives may be ignored and foreign courts
are not bound or likely to execute them. The empty
symbolism of such directives is more likely to dissuade
Canadian courts from making them.
Typically, in the absence of the defendant abroad,
enforcement is happenstance rather than reliable. The
complainant or government officer, as the case may be,
may have to wait quietly until the defendant shows up
in Canada or, alternatively, find property of the defendant within Canada that a court is willing to attach in
order to force the defendant to respond. In the end, the
uncertainty of enforcement of these prescriptively laudable protections suggests that unilateral action by Canadian officials and courts in specific instances is not
enough. It would be wise to buttress them, just as with
the regulatory needs of the Internet and market competition, with a multilateral agreement. In this case the
objective would be to establish internationally accepted

The major benefit to considering extraterritorial
action on the macro level is the ability of such an analysis to promote a measured, restrained, and judicious
approach to any consideration of extending Canada’s
claim to jurisdiction. A major question must always be
not merely how to act extraterritorially, but whether to
do so at all. The following template is an attempt to give
guidance in answering both of those questions.
However, no analytical framework can offer guidance on the wisdom of acting extraterritorially in a
given case: that is a decision for policy-makers, based on
their views of the desirable social policy stance for
Canada. What follows, therefore, is an analytical tool that
aims to set out the various considerations to take into
account in deciding whether extraterritorial action is a
practical and viable approach to whatever issue is perceived as a social problem. It does not attempt to say
what such problems and their solutions would be.
Further, as emphasized above, no single answer can
be offered to the question of when and whether Canada
should act extraterritorially. What we present, therefore,
is a set of general policy objectives that are particular to
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and that will
underpin decision-making, followed by a series of questions aimed at deciding whether extraterritorial action is
advisable in any given situation, in the sense that it is a
practical response to the issue. As part of that analysis, the
question of what sort of extraterritorial action might be
appropriate will be incorporated. Further, within each
question we will point to a number of considerations
that can help guide the analysis.
General Policy Objectives
Canada should support the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction in a manner that encourages and supports an international society that is ordered, fair, just,
and peaceable, rather than chaotic and conflicted.
Hence:
(a) All exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction
should, to the greatest extent possible, be consistent with the larger interests of inter-state
comity, and apply the principles of non-intervention, accommodation, mutuality, and proportionality.
(b) Canada should regulate extraterritorial conduct
only if it has a bona fide and substantial connection to Canada.
(c) International law agreements should be implemented and executed in good faith. This prin-
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ciple is particularly important in regard to
human rights treaties in connection with jurisdiction over the person.
(d) Canada should uphold the international rule of
law by extending its jurisdiction in a manner
that avoids having lawless territories.
Question 1: Can the desired goals be accomplished, or largely accomplished, or largely so, based on a
real and substantial connection to Canada without any
need to rely on genuinely extraterritorial measures?
Comments: The first question must always be
whether extraterritorial action is genuinely required at
all. This observation is not necessarily just a note of
caution, but also an observation that much can be done
that will be recognized by Canadian courts and others as
based on a real and substantial connection to Canada.
Anything that meets this criterion can be considered to
be territorial action, not extraterritorial at all. This point
is not always clearly recognized (see the discussion of the
SOCAN decision in Part IV) and so is worth incorporating into any analysis.
Question 2: Will the proposed measures be recognized under jurisdictional principles at international law
as legitimate steps for Canada to take?
Comments: Assuming that the desired goals actually require extraterritorial action, the first practical question to be asked is whether such action on Canada’s part
will be seen as acceptable by other States. Canada’s goal
ought not to be merely to symbolically assert jurisdiction
over actions occurring outside Canada’s territory. If extraterritorial action is worthwhile, it is because such action
can have practical consequences, which as a general rule
will require the support of other States. Accordingly,
Canada ought to look to the principles of jurisdiction
recognized at international law as an initial guide. If
Canada’s claim to act extraterritorially will not be supported by other nations, Canada should show real hesitation.
Question 3: If the proposed measures are not recognized at international law as legitimate steps for
Canada to take, is this one of the rare instances where it
is worthwhile to act in the absence of international consensus? In particular, is the issue of such great significance that it is worth suffering whatever negative consequences might flow from such unilaterality? Further, is
there a realistic prospect that the measures will achieve
their ends (whether those are actually to enforce rules, to
change international opinion, or some other goal)
without the initial support of other nations?
Comments: If the answer to our second question is
‘‘no’’, then it would be surprising if it were still seen as
worthwhile for extraterritorial measures to be introduced. However, that it would be surprising is not to say
that it is utterly unimaginable. There could be rare
instances where, due to the importance of the issue at
stake and the lack of other options, Canada decides to

act against the accepted international view. Our template
can offer no guidance on when policy-makers should see
an issue as being of such unusually pressing importance
as to justify such unilateral action: only that this step
should not be taken except when that decision has been
made. Even then, or perhaps especially then, it is particularly relevant to consider the effectiveness of such action:
by definition Canada could expect little if any assistance
from other nations in enforcing the law. This might be
satisfactory if the goal of the legislation was to lead
‘‘international public opinion’’, or if it was sufficient to
enforce the law only when Canada already had jurisdiction over the person.
Question 4: If the proposed measures are recognized at international law as legitimate steps for Canada
to take, are they also measures that are consistent with
the traditional Canadian approach to extraterritoriality?
If they are not, can a departure from that tradition be
justified because of the seriousness of the problem to be
addressed or other factors?
Comments: Even if a proposed exertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction might be recognized at international law, it does not follow that the action is consistent
with Canadian tradition in acting extraterritorially. We
have noted frequently throughout this paper that the
question of when Canada should act extraterritorially is
quite distinct from the question of when it can do so. To
date Canada has shown considerable restraint. As noted,
Canada has very infrequently relied on the nationality
principle, for example, though such a claim would be
more frequently recognized at international law. Canada
has a very few laws founded on the protective principle,
and has only in extremely limited circumstances unilaterally asserted universal jurisdiction. In practice Canada
has tended to act extraterritorially almost exclusively in
the context of multilateral international agreements.
Nothing has occurred that should change that general
tendency. Again, however, that is not to say that a departure from this approach could never be justified: merely
that it would need to be justified. The exact nature of
that justification cannot really be defined or limited,
other than to note that it would require particularly
compelling circumstances to justify a departure from
Canada’s traditional ‘‘comfort zone’’. An increasingly relevant query will be whether, in appropriate circumstances, Canada should defer to an appropriate international forum that is or could become seized of the issue.
Question 5: If extraterritorial action is, in the circumstances, an approach Canada both can and should
take, consideration must be given to the proper method
of acting extraterritorially. Where the goal is enforcement of Canadian standards outside Canadian territory,
this might be accomplished through mandatory legislation where the combination of legislative and judicial
mechanisms make enforcement likely. In other circumstances executive action to enlist foreign assistance in
enforcing Canadian penal or regulatory laws might be a
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better approach. Much will depend on the precise goal of
the extraterritorial action.

would be more than outweighed by the negative consequences that could flow.

Comments: Presuming that it has been determined that the problem to be addressed falls into circumstances where Canada both can and should act
extraterritorially, the next question becomes the method
by which Canada should act. The answer to this inquiry
will be shaped by the target at whom the action is
directed, i.e., whether Canada is seeking to extraterritorially affect the behaviour of individuals, corporations or
other states.

Equally, even if there are no direct retaliatory
impacts, or more subtly, no impacts from diminished
relations with other states, a further issue to be considered is the attitude that Canada would adopt to other
nations asserting a similar extraterritorial claim — in particular, whether such claims would infringe unacceptably on Canada’s territorial jurisdiction. In assessing any
extraterritorial approach, particularly mandatory laws,
Canada should consider their reciprocal application.
From a purely national perspective gains might be perceived from asserting an extraterritorial claim: if that
same claim were made by other states impinging on
Canadian sovereignty, however, once again the result
might be a net loss for Canadian interests. In such circumstances extraterritorial action would be ill-advised.
Also, Canada should explicitly recognize that assertions
of extraterritorial jurisdiction may contribute to a body
of state practice that may develop into a new rule of
customary international law, and should consider
whether such a rule would be both in its own interests
and beneficial to the international community as a
whole.

Most obviously, it is possible to act through legislation. The simplest manner in which this can be done is
for the legislature to pass laws that are then left to the
courts to enforce. More forceful and/or multi-layered
approaches are also available. For example, the legislature
may put legislation in place that provides for a directing
role for the Crown to pursue extraterritorial objectives
by executive action, or before the courts, or otherwise.
Alternatively, the executive may put in place (with or
without the participation of the legislature) sets of selfregulation guidelines, or economic incentives. However,
as we have noted above, these will not always be the
most effective or most appropriate methods.
In some cases, purely executive action might be a
more appropriate approach. As discussed above, in Part
II(C)(2), there can be problems to which economic sanctions are the appropriate response. Less confrontationally, negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding with
another state or states might provide Canada with any
solution it was looking for. The major potential drawback is the risk that Canada’s voice at the negotiating
table might be drowned out by those of more powerful
nations, with the result that executive action will not
achieve the desired result.
Question 6: Does a cost-benefit analysis of the
potential international impacts of this extraterritorial
action indicate that it is the preferable route for Canada
to take? In particular, do the potential responses by other
states (if any) represent more in the way of costs than
Canada is willing to bear in order to fulfil its extraterritorial objective?
Comments: Finally, even if based on all the considerations above it appears that the circumstances are such
that extraterritorial action by Canada seems appropriate,
any final decision should wait on first asking what the
consequences might be of the action. If the action is
taken in accordance with a multilateral agreement, few
concerns should arise in this regard. However, states normally do not unilaterally act extraterritorially because of
concerns about comity: if Canada chooses on some occasion to unilaterally act extraterritorially, it is important to
consider whether other states might take action in
response to Canada’s decision, and what the nature and
consequences of that action might be. Possibly any perceived gains to Canada from the extraterritorial action

D. The Way Ahead?
Given the kinds of uncertainty described above, it
seems clear that Canada continues the march to globalization with tools that may not be completely up to the
task. To be sure, the route thus travelled is safe; Canada
can easily continue to conservatively exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in situations where doing so does not
offend international comity, and promote multilateral
solutions for problems that might bring it into conflict
with other states. These tools can also be refined to suit
particular problems, by various means that have been
proposed throughout this paper.
To combat the continuing evolution of transnational crime, Canada can expand its use of techniques
that are legal, if not traditional (e.g., make greater use of
the nationality principle), while continuing to push for
greater elasticity of jurisdictional principles as between
states. On the regulatory side, in the short term the
courts can continue to develop the ‘‘real and substantial
connection’’ test, making more nuanced and contextspecific attempts than they have thus far to locate the
point at which connectedness and inter-state comity
may collide. The courts, however, have the resources to
continue this jurisdictional ‘‘tweaking’’ only so far. In the
longer term these efforts can be supported by the executive, which is better equipped to develop actual policy
responses to the pressures and changes stemming from
the globalization of both trade and communication. The
executive can negotiate international agreements that
either dispense with the need for extraterritorial jurisdiction or compel states to exercise it. The legislature can
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then implement these agreements, prescribing the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction clearly and in a
manner that directly reflects the vagaries of the subject
matter. Indeed, as has been shown here, this kind of
synergy between the branches of government in formulating extraterritoriality has served Canada reasonably
well thus far.
There is more, however, that can be done. Recalling
the discussion above, the major lesson from extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction is that Canada has not acted
unilaterally except in circumstances where there was
clear international law consensus supporting its ability to
do so. Thus, most exercises of extraterritoriality are deliberately multilateral, and those which are not are supportable by general international consensus on when it is
legitimate to claim such jurisdiction.
That is not universally true, however. It is open to
Canada to act extraterritorially in advance of consensus
having formed: in effect, to attempt to lead international
opinion by example. We have noted earlier Canada’s
exertion of jurisdiction over Arctic waters, later approved
by other countries. Similarly, one might note that the
child sex tourism provisions, though now perfectly in
line with international treaties, actually preceded the
signing of those treaties. 167 Perhaps the terrorism provisions not yet consequent on international treaties will
eventually lead to the existence of such treaties, one
more building block towards a consensus that expansive
use of extraterritorial jurisdiction is a necessary tool.
That said, this is an option that should be used
sparingly and cautiously. Canada, though not the
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smallest boat on the lake, most frequently sails with
larger ones: the odds of it being caught in someone else’s
wake are far greater than of Canada changing the course
of others. Canada’s domestic privacy legislation, as we
have noted, largely results from the economic influence
of the European Union, which left Canada little practical
alternative but to comply: the United States, though,
being a larger market still, did not create the same kind
of legislation that Canada did, but has not lost access to
European markets. Similarly, Canada could try unilaterally to impose its views on copyright law on the international community, taking the robust approach to ‘‘real
and substantial connection’’ that the SOCAN case suggests. This carries a certain risk, however, that if Canada
‘‘legitimizes’’ one state unilaterally imposing its standards
on others by doing so itself, this helps to free up the
dominant players to act likewise, and in a way that
might not accord with Canadian interests. With specific
regard to copyright, the dominance of U.S. intellectual
property interests internationally dictates that unilateral
use of extraterritorial jurisdiction by that country could
end up imposing American copyright law on Canada as
well as others.
Even allowing that exceptional circumstances might
exist where Canada could and should act unilaterally in
the absence of international consensus, it must choose
the occasions sparingly. While the edifice of territoriality
is being slowly dismantled by globalization, this should
compel Canada to be defensive and proactive in equal
measures as it seeks both to protect and to promote its
own interests in the new global order.
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